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In 1994, the Ninth Circuit affirmed standing for citizens to sue to
compel the EPA Administrator to undertake a statewide TMDL
program. Although the citizens had standing for only some of the
water-quality-limited waters in Alaska, the court held that the
underlying cause of action was the EPA's failure to initiate the
TMDL process for Alaska. This Note proposes that the court
improperly reasoned its way to the correct holding. Like the EPA,
the court confused standing to sue with the ultimate scope of the
remedy. This Note proposes a three-step analysis to consider issues
of standing and remedy. The first step is to determine the scope of
the underlying action by analyzing the legal duty that forms the basis
for the claim. This scoping action is critical since it serves as the
referent for the next two steps. The second step is to determine
whether the plaintiff has standing with respect to the underlying
action. If the court decides on the merits of the case that the plaintiff
should prevail, the third step is to determine the appropriate remedy.
In this step, the court starts with the underlying cause of action and
incorporates other factors as appropriate. This three-step analysis
decouples the standing and remedy analyses and should lead to better
reasoned opinions.
* Student, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College, J.D. expected 1996;
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I. INTRODUCrION
In Alaska Center for the Environment v. Browner (ACE III),1 the
Ninth Circuit distinguished between standing to sue and the ultimate
scope of the remedy. The court affirmed standing for a group of
citizens to compel the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
1. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE III), 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994). The entire'
case history is Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE 1), 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991)
(finding that Alaska made a constructive submission that no total maximum daily loads, or
TMDLs, were necessary for Alaska, triggering the EPA's nondiscretionary duties), later
proceeding Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: Standing,
Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly, No. C90-595R (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 1992) (order denying
partial summary judgment to limit remedy on the basis of standing) [hereinafter Standing
Order], later proceeding Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE II) (granting a statewide
TMDL remedy), 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff'd Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v.
Browner (ACE 111), 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the statewide TMDL remedy).
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Administrator to perform her nondiscretionary duty to set total
maximum daily loads (TMDLs)2 for all the water quality limited
(WQL) waters in Alaska? Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that
in light of the EPA's thirteen-year dereliction of duty, the district
court did not abuse'its discretion in granting a statewide remedy.'
However, like the EPA, which the district court chided as having
"confuse[d] standing requirements with the ultimate scope of the
court's remedy,"5 the Ninth Circuit jumbled the two in its afialysis.
Other courts have also commingled standing and remedy by denying
standing to plaintiffs where it would be more appropriate to limit the
scope of the remedy.' This Note proposes that litigants and courts
confuse standing and the scope of the remedy because they do not
first determine the scope of the disputed action. Confusing standing
and remedy is of more than academic importance. By indiscriminate-
ly mixing standing and remedy, courts open the way for further
confusion.7 Where confusion exists, the potential for inequitable
decisions increases. This Note attempts to reduce the confusion and
the attendant possibility of inequity.
It is important to establish the appropriate analysis because the
issues raised in ACE III will likely arise again in the future. Only a
few states have undertaken the required TMDL process. As other
citizen groups seek to compel the EPA Administrator to perform her
2. Total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) are required for water quality limited (WQL)
bodies of water. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
3. See ACE III, 20 F.3d at 984-86.
4. Id. at 987.
5. Standing Order, supra note 1, at 10. Specifically, the EPA confused the standing
requirements of injury in fact and redressability with the scope of the remedy. ACE 111, 20 F.3d
at 984. The source of this confusion is a central theme of this Note.
6. E.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Reilly (CLF), 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991), discussed
infra at notes 107, 241-50 and accompanying text; cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 240 n.18
(1979) ("The Court of Appeals appeared to confuse the question of whether petitioner had
standing with the question of whether she had asserted a proper cause of action").
7. To borrow the words of Justice Brennan, "an approach that treats separately the distinct
issues of standing, reviewability, and the merits decides each on the basis of its own criteria,
assures that these often complex questions will be squarely faced, thus contributing to better
reasoned decisions and to greater confidence that justice has in fact been done." Association
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(arguing against the majority's requirement that a plaintiff's interest fall within the zone of
interests protected by the statute in question).
8. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 929-30 (1992); infra note 62; Joan Laatz & Rob Eure, Environmentalists Sue EPA Over
Water Protection, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 15, 1994, at B3.
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nondiscretionary duty to set TMDLs under the Clean Water Act
(CWA), courts and litigants will face standing and remedy issues
similar to those in ACE III. Furthermore, confusion of standing and
remedies extends beyond TMDLs and the CWA. The common
confusion is to ask whether the plaintiff has standing for the remedy.
However, this approach is incorrect. A plaintiff has standing with
respect to the underlying action. Courts can easily determine the
scope of the action at the outset of litigation and should avoid
determining the remedy until the close of the litigation.
This Note proposes that the appropriate manner in which to
analyze the standing-remedy problem is through a three-step
analysis.' The first step is to determine the extent of the act that the
defendant performed or the duty that the defendant violated (the
"scoping" step). The second step is to determine whether the plaintiff
has standing to challenge that act or violated duty (the "standing"
step). After deciding the merits of the case, the final step is to
determine the appropriate scope of the remedy (the "remedy" step).
This framework decouples standing and remedy and the concerns that
factor into each inquiry.
Section II establishes the general principles of the three-step
analysis and describes the appropriate determination of the scope of
an action. Section II also provides background on standing, remedies,
and the CWA. The CWA discussion focuses on TMDLs and its
citizen suit provision; the remedies discussion focuses on injunctions
and equitable discretion. Section III analyzes the history, issues,
arguments, and ultimate resolution of ACE III. This section contrasts
the court's analysis in ACE III with this Note's three-step analysis.
Section IV discusses the implications that this case and the three-step
analysis may have in other cases and jurisdictions. The author
concludes that the three-step analysis would help courts frame and
subsequently address the issues more clearly, yielding rulings that
appropriately resolve. standing and remedy problems.
II. THE THREE-STEP ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND
A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The general principle of this Note is that, although a plaintiff
cannot seek relief without establishing standing, the relief sought may
9. For the purposes of this Note, the analytical framework that the author proposes will
be called the "three-step" or "three-step analysis."
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well extend beyond the plaintiff's injury in fact if the injury is the
result of a single discrete action. ° This may seem self-evident, but
litigants and courts continue to confuse the standing requirement of
injury in fact with the scope of the remedy that the court may grant.
The confusion arises in part because the parties do not establish the
scope of the disputed action from the outset of the case.
When using the three-step analysis, a court would determine: (1)
the scope of the cause of action (for example, statutory violation); (2)
whether the plaintiff has standing to sue with respect to the cause of
action; and (3) if the plaintiff establishes standing, the appropriate
scope of the remedy. The first step is usually straightforward, but it
is critical to the other two steps. Clearly stating the cause of action
can make the analysis much simpler and more accurate, as the
underlying legal duty discerned in the first step is the referent for
both the standing and remedy analysis. In the second step, the
litigants and court should consider the three constitutional standing
requirements of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability," along
with any prudential standing requirements that might apply.'2 This
step is particularly important in controversies involving citizen suit
provisions in environmental laws that allow citizens to sue the EPA
Administrator to compel the performance of a nondiscretionary duty,
since the underlying legal duty is often broad in scope. 3 The court
10. If there is no underlying discrete action, the plaintiff cannot seek such expansive relief.
That claims are similar is not sufficient; they must have a common cause.
11. This is the basic three-step test of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders), 112 S.
Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
12. A statutory interest usually supersedes prudential requirements. Peter A. Alpert,
Citizen Suits Under the Clean Air Act Universal Standing for the Uninjured Private Attorney
General?, 16 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 283, 305-07 (1988); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975).
13. Where statutes impose statewide or nationwide obligations, establishing the scope of
the duty supplants arguments asserting that the plaintiff has standing for only its particular injury
in fact. See e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browning (ACE II), 20 F.3d 981, 985-86 (9th Cir.
1994). For these statutes (including citizen suit provisions), the scope of the violation is usually
straightforward. The plaintiff simply needs to indicate which statutory section or sections the
Administrator has violated. Then, the relevant questions are whether the Administrator's action
or inaction harmed the plaintiff (injury in fact and traceability) and whether compelling the
Administrator to perform the statutory act or duty would remedy the plaintiff's injury
(redressability). See infra note 107 discussing CLE.
For example, in ACE III, the argument can be made that the EPA's inaction is the failure
to set TMDLs for those waters used by the plaintiff. However, the statute unambiguously
requires each state to set TMDLs for all watei quality limited waters within its state. If the state
fails to perform adequately, the EPA must step in. The duty is with respect to the entire state's
waters. The Ninth Circuit relied on the CWA's priority ranking as a further indication that the
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needs to determine whether the plaintiff has standing to challenge the
defendant's (in ACE III, the EPA's) action or inaction; the measure
should not be the extent of the injury, but rather the extent of the
duty violated.
Once a plaintiff has established standing, the court then rules
on the merits of the claim. Finally, the 'court must decide the scope
of the remedy.4  A court's granting standing does not ensure that
the court will enjoin or compel the defendant's action in whole or
even in part. When exercising its equitable discretion in granting an
injunction, a court may consider several factors: whether the statute
under which the plaintiff is suing allows for discretion; 5 the nature
and extent of the plaintiff's injuries; 6 the burden that an injunction
would impose on the defendant; 7 the utility of granting an injunc-
tion;" the availability of other remedies;19 and other factors the
court deems appropriate. The final action may range from no
injunction,20 to an injunction that applies only to the plaintiff's
injury,2' to an injunction that compels or forbids the underlying
duties are imposed on a statewide basis, because otherwise citizens could impose their own
prioritization based on the waters for which they have standing rather than on the severity of
the pollution and the uses of the water. See ACE II1, 20 F.3d at 985; 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A).
14. There may be intermediate justiciability issues of mootness and ripeness, but once a
plaintiff establishes standing (including that he was injured in a concrete way, that the defendant
was the cause of the injury, and that a favorable judgment would redress plaintiffs injury), the
next major phase of the case is remedy.
15. In TVA v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1543 (1973), "admits of no exception" and thus foreclosed the usual equitable discretion.
437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978). In contrast,' the Supreme Court later found that the CWA did not
foreclose the court's usual exercise of equitable discretion because the statutory scheme and
purpose generally requires the court to balance interests. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456
U.S. 305, 320 (1982).
16. This constitutes the burden to the plaintiff. The extent may be geographic, qualitative,
or quantitative (how many people were harmed).
17. The burden might be in the form of infringing on the discretion of an agency in how
to conduct affairs, economic burden, or other similar concerns. E.g., Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
at 318-19 (burden heavy on Navy and national defense); ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 986-87 (burden
minimal on the EPA's discretion in how to pursue legal obligations).
18. For example, in Romero-Barcelo, the Supreme Court found that an injunction was not
warranted because the Navy had applied for a permit and there was no reason to think that it
would not receive the permit. 456 U.S. at 320.
19. If a legal remedy is available that would redress the plaintiff's injury, an injunction is
inappropriate. Id. at 312.
20. The court might find that although the defendant's action or inaction injured the
plaintiff, the balance of the interests weighs against any form of injunction. E.g., id.
21. E.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Reilly (CLF), 950 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1991).
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action that injured the plaintiff even though the injunction redresses
others' injuries.
B. Scope of the Disputed Action
The plaintiff's legal action' depends on the nature of the
underlying legal duty, which originates in positive law.24  This
determination is frequently a trivial procedural exercise, but it can be
critical to how one approaches the remaining issues in a case. Once
a court establishes the scope of the action, the action serves as the
referent for future analyses. In determining whether a plaintiff has
standing, the court will inquire whether the plaintiff has standing with
respect to the action. In determining what relief a plaintiff should get,
the court will start its remedial analysis with the complained-of action.
Consequently, defining the scope of the action sets up the case-
specific parameters for subsequent analyses. If a court too narrowly
circumscribes the scope of the action, the court risks an inequitable
result.' Similarly, if a court defines the scope of an action too
broadly, the court risks a separation of powers problem by compelling
the Executive Branch to act beyond the province of the court's power.
Frequently, the scoping step is so obvious that both parties agree as
to the extent of the action, even though they dispute the merits of the
case.
A more complicated scenario arises when one party harms many
parties, particularly when only a subclass of the injured parties files
suit. Then, the issue is whether the injuries resulted from multiple
actions or from a discrete action by the defendant. For example, if
the EPA finds in five separate cases that five specific bodies of water
22. For the purposes of this paper, "action" includes both affirmative acts and omissions
or inaction; see also, Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1988) (defining agency
action to include failure to act).
23. Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions,
45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 513, 536-38 (1984).
24. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, in THE SuPRE~m COURT REVIEW, 37, 63
(Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that for standing purposes, injuries cannot be
identified without reference to positive law and noting the recent shift in Supreme Court
precedent to support his thesis).
25. If Congress established a discrete duty composed of subparts and a court held that the
subparts were themselves independent discrete duties, the court would deny standing for the
overarching duty unless the plaintiff established standing for each subpart. Where the subparts
are interdependent, as in ACE III, denying standing for the overarching discrete duty would not
properly redress the cause of the plaintiff's injury. Furthermore, such a ruling could also violate
separation of powers by infringing on the power of Congress to write laws.
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are not WQL, and so it does not need to set TMDLs for those bodies,
then each finding is arguably a different action.26 Alternatively, if
the EPA determines in a single action that five specific bodies of
water are not WQL, and it does not need to set TMDLs, then that
finding is a single action. This analysis may seem formalistic for the
above example,27 but it has significant implications where an over-
arching plan dictates the outcome of otherwise separate actions.
Rather than 'challenging each action individually, injured plaintiffs can
then challenge the validity of the entire plan.'
Determining the scope of the litigated action is critical in framing
the subsequent issues. To decide if the plaintiff has standing to bring
the case, a court must ascertain standing with respect to a particular
action. The remedy is similarly dependent on what constitutes the
alleged violation. Consequently, in order to accurately analyze
standing and remedy, a court must first accurately determine the
scope of the disputed action.
C. Standing
Having determined the scope of the disputed action, a court must
then determine whether the plaintiff has standing to bring suit.29 A
jurisdictional doctrine requiring that the plaintiff have a sufficient
stake in the case to ensure diligent prosecution, 0 standing is a
26. It may be that the separate findings of no TMDI.s are part of a concerted plan to not
promulgate TMDLs. The overarching plan would be a discrete action whose success depends
on separate actions. The success of this argument would depend on the concreteness of the plan
(see Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (holding that there was no plan)) and
on the extent to which theoverarching plan dictates the outcome of the separate action (see
infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text).
27. In an effort to have fewer actions challenged, an agency-the EPA in this exam-
ple-would simply make separate findings. Thus, only those particular actions-declining to set
TMDLs for a particular water body-for which injured parties came forward could be
challenged. However, if the decision is part of a definite, concrete plan to not set TMDLs, then
the entire plan can be challenged. Compare the arguments made in the context of Land and
Resource Management Plans, infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
28. This is efficient for all involved: it reduces court costs for both parties, it reduces the
uncertainty about future actions, and it reduces the burden on the court system. This reasoning
is similar to that used to justify class actions.
29. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article 111, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 163,168-96 (1992) (providing a history of standing and an analysis
of its components).
30. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (holding that plaintiffs had standing
to challenge the apportionment of voting districts); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32
(1972) (holding that although aesthetic and environmental injuries were cognizable legal injuries
for standing purposes, the Sierra Club did not have standing because the Club did not
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mixture of constitutional and prudential requirements that restricts
access to the courts, as well as statutory grants of interest that
facilitate access to the courts.3' The Case or Controversy Clause
32
of the Constitution is the root of the standing doctrine.3 Through
a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to
require a plaintiff to prove: (1) that a concrete and particularized
injury is either actual or imminent (the "injury in fact" requirement);
(2) that the injury is traceable to an action by the defendant (the
"traceability" or "causation" requirement); and (3) that a judicial
remedy will redress the plaintiff's injury (the "redressability" require-
ment).3 1 If the plaintiff fails to satisfy any one of these require-
ments, the plaintiff lacks standing, even if the plaintiff otherwise
satisfies the statutory requirements for bringing a citizen suit.3
The theory behind the doctrine of standing has evolved from a
standard of vigorous prosecution to one of separation of powers.36
Initially, the Court was concerned that a plaintiff who did not have a
sufficient stake in the claim would not vigorously litigate or prosecute
sufficiently allege that its members would be injured); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,101-02
(1983) (h6lding that plaintiff did not have standing to compel the L.A. Police Department to
change chokehold practices).
31. See, e.g., Robert B. June, Citizen Suits: The Structure of Standing Requirements for
Citizen Suits and the Scope of Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. 761, 768 (1994).
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
33. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
34. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders), 112 S. Ct. 2130,2136 (1992) (holding that
the plaintiffs did not have standing because they did not satisfy injury in fact or redressability).
For a thorough analysis of the impact of Defenders, see Sunstein, supra note 29. See also Harold
Feld, Saving the Citizen Suit: The Effect of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and the Role of
Citizen Suits in Environmental Enforcement, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 141 (1994); Stanley E.
Rice, Standing on Shaky Ground- The Supreme Court Curbs Standing for Environmental
Plaintiffs in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 199 (1993).
35. See, e.g., Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2136-37.
36. Rice, supra note 34, at 208-12. Standing was traditionally viewed as being based on
separation of powers. It was not until around 1960 that vigorous prosecution became a
significant factor. Justice Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 882-85 (1983). The most liberal
standards for standing came in the early 1970s with Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
(holding that aesthetic and environmental injuries were cognizable legal injuries for standing
purposes but denying standing to the Sierra Club because the Club did not sufficiently allege
that its members would be injured), and United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures ("SCRAP"), 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (holding that students had standing to
challenge a proposed increase in railroad freight rates because the higher rates would decrease
recycling and increase the use of natural resources, thereby reducing their enjoyment of those
natural resources).
1996]
DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM
the case.37 In recent years, the adequate prosecution analysis has
yielded to a separation of powers analysis.3 Justice Scalia, who has
written the two most recent Supreme Court standing cases,39 has
asserted that standing is strictly a separation of powers concern."
With the focus no longer on whether a party would vigorously
litigate a case, citizen-plaintiffs pursuing environmental claims are
facing more challenges to standing.4' Faced with a narrower
interpretation of standing,4 2 many courts are denying standing to
citizens outright, instead of granting standing but otherwise limiting
the plaintiffs' remedy.4 Thus, confusion about standing shades into
confusion regarding the scope of the remedy.
D. Remedies: Injunctions and Equitable Discretion
Frequently, environmental plaintiffs seek a remedy with a scope
exceeding the specific bounds of their injury in fact. By their nature,
environmental injuries typically are widespread: water pollution can
37. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1-962); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 731-32.
38. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982) (holding that taxpayers did not have standing to
challenge the transfer of surplus government real property to a church because neither
psychological injury or paying taxes was sufficient to establish injury in fact); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) ("[Ihe law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea-the
idea of separation of powers"); Defenders, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. The principle underlying
separation of powers is that the role of the courts is "solely to decide on the rights of individu-
als, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have
a discretion." Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
39. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation (NWF), 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Defenders, 112 S.
Ct. at 2130. In recent years, Justice Scalia has driven the separation of powers view of standing.
Rice, supra note 34, at 227.
40. Scalia, supra note 36, at 881. In fact, Justice Scalia would deny standing to those who
share injury with a majority of U.S. citizens, because in a democracy a majority can always exert
its power and prevent it from being further injured. Id. at 894. This view has significant
implications in environmental law where injuries are often diffuse and widespread. See also
Rice, supra note 34, at 226-28 (critiquing Justice Scalia's view of standing).
41. See Feld, supra note 34, at 145 n.18, 162-63. If Congress wanted to grant everyone
standing to sue under a statute, it could simply amend the statute to include a cash bounty for
plaintiffs who bring suit. This qui tam provision would provide the necessary stake in a case to
assure adversity and satisfy separation of powers concerns. See id. at 182; Sunstein, supra note
29, at 232-34.
42. See Feld, supra note 34, at 152-53.
43. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 n.22 (1968) ("the standing rationale was simply a
device used by the Court to avoid judicial inquiry into questions of social policy and the political
wisdom of Congress") citing Maurice Finkelstein,JudicialSelf-Limitation, 37 HARV. L. REV. 338,
359-64 (1924). Although Finkelstein's observation is seventy years old, it continues to apply
today as it did in F/ast. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 100.
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injure people for miles downstream,' hazardous waste can displace
entire communities,4 and air pollution can travel hundreds of
miles.4 6 The plaintiff, seeking to end the injury, requests the court
to enjoin the cause of the injury.47 Since the underlying cause has
often injured many people, the plaintiff may request a remedy that
extends beyond his particular injury in fact. Consequently, establish-
ing the underlying legal duty that the defendant allegedly violated is
an important step towards determining an appropriate remedy.
One example of this typical scenario, where a single, discrete act
injures many, arises when an agency violates a statutory duty. Citizen
suit provisions allowing private enforcement of these duties usually
refer to nondiscretionary duties, as distinguished from discretionary
duties-the former being subject to citizen enforcement while the
latter are not. Examples range from failing to evaluate the impact of
an agency action on the environment4" to refusing to set TMDLs for
a state's WQL water bodies.49 In these examples, action or inaction
harms many, and the court need not limit the remedy to the plaintiffs
particular injury. By instead addressing the underlying cause of the
injury, the courts would be able to grant a more expansive remedy.
In most environmental cases, a plaintiff seeks an injunction to
end the injurious action.50 In order to obtain an injunction, the
44. See generally Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 993-95 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469
U.S. 1196 (1985) (plaintiff seeking to compel the EPA Administrator to establish TMDLs for
waters draining into Lake Michigan).
45. Love Canal, NY, and Times Beach, MO, are two of the more notorious examples.
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 201-03. See generally Charles Davis, Approaches to the
Regulation of Hazardous Wastes, 18 ENVrL L. 505 (1988).
46. See, e-g., R. Nicole Cordan, Lost in the Haze? Central Arizona Fulfills Congress's
Promise to Protect Visibility in the National Parks, 24 ENVTL L. 1371, 1372-78 (1994) (discussing
the effect of air pollution on national parks).
47. A plaintiff may not obtain damages for injuries suffered by others. See Wails v. Waste
Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311,316 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the CWA allows injunctive relief
but not a private right of action for damages). The one exception to this would be where the
other plaintiffs are effectively represented through a class action.
48. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Forest Service must
complete an environmental impact statement where connected effects are sufficiently certain).
49. E.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE III), 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994). In
this situation, everyone who uses water quality limited waters is adversely affected by the EPA's
refusal to promulgate TMDLs. When someone sues to compel the EPA to perform their
statutory duty-promulgating TMDLs for the state-the plaintiff will normally be seeking a
more expansive remedy than his suffered injury. The plaintiff, having standing for some water
quality limited waters, probably does not have standing for all water quality'limited bodies of
water in the state.
50. E.g., Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d at 315-16.
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plaintiff must prove that he suffered irreparable injury and that legal
remedies are inadequate.5 If the plaintiffs claim satisfies these two
threshold criteria, a court may issue an injunction. Since an injunction
is an equitable remedy, a court usually has discretion as to whether
it will grant the request and as to the scope of the final remedy."
However, where the injury arises from a violation of a statutory duty,
a court will analyze the statute's language and the legislative intent to
determine whether the statute allows courts to exercise equitable
discretion in granting an injunction.53
Based on the statute in question, a court usually may exercise its
discretion to determine the appropriate scope of an injunction, and
the injunction might therefore be more expansive or limited than the
plaintiff's injury in fact.
51. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (holding that the CWA did
not preclude equitable discretion, so the trial court did not have to issue an injunction where the
equities weighed against an injunction). See also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,702 (1979)
(holding that the Social Security Act does not preclude injunctive relief and that the plaintiffs
could seek prerecoupment hearing relief).
52. See Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. In Village of Gambell, the Supreme Court held
that courts have equitable discretion unless there is a clear statement of congressional intent in
a statute to foreclose the discretion. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 543
(1987) (holding that there is no clear indication in the Alaska National Interest Lands
Conservation Act that Congress intended to limit district courts' equitable discretion by
requiring them to issue injunctions in all cases). See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. at 200.
53. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320. In Romero-Barcelo, the Court found that the Clean
Water Act frequently allowed for balancing the interests of the EPA, states, and individuals. See
id. at 316-19. This was in contrast to TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), where the Court held
that the Endangered Species Act did not allow for any discretion or balancing of interests, and
so there was no discretion as to the extent a court may grant an injunction, Id. at 173.
Professor Brown has argued that when a right is statutory rather than constitutional, courts
should defer to Congress' institutional expertise in remedial matters, George D. Brown, Letting
Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J.
263, 265-66 (1989). Professor Plater would further limit a court's equitable discretion when
dealing with statutory violations. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable
Discretion, 70 CAL L. REV. 524, 527 (1982) (Plater's thesis is that "[w]hen a court in equity is
confronted on the merits with a continuing violation of statutory law, it has no discretion or
authority-to balance the equities so as to permit that violation to continue."). See also ELAINE
W. SHOBEN & WM. MuRRAY TABB, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON REMEDIES 254 (1989) ("A,
statute may affect equitable discretion in many ways: (1) by enumerating some remedies but
not others, leaving a question of interpretation whether additional remedies may be implied; or
(2) by prohibiting courts from issuing injunctions in a narrowly defined type of dispute; or (3)
by requiring a court to enjoin certain types of conduct upon a showing that the statutory
elements are met").
For a discussion of the factors that a court may consider in exercising its equitable
discretion, see infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
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E. Clean Water Act and TMDLs
Congress passed the Clean Water Act54 (CWA or Act) "to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters."'55 In order to accomplish these goals,
Congress mandated a two-pronged approach. First, it applied
technology-based limits on a nationwide basis through a permit system
(NPDES permits). 6 Second, where technology-based limits proved
insufficient to ensure water quality,57 Congress required more
stringent water-quality-based standards.58
The EPA and the states implement water-quality-based standards
through TMDLs. The Act requires each state to identify WQL
bodies of water within its borders, meaning those bodies for which
technology-based requirements are not stringent enough to protect
their designated uses.59 In addition, each state must priority rank the
bodies of water, taking into account the severity of the pollution and
the designated uses of the waters,6' and then establish the TMDL for
54. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Congress originally passed the FWPCA in 1948. After the 1972 amendments the FWPCA
became known as the Clean Water Act. (For a good overview of the CWA, William F.
Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1988)).
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
56. The CWA requires point sources to obtain a permit prior to discharging any pollutants
into navigable bodies of water. 33 U.S.C § 1311 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). These permits are part
of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System and commonly termed "NPDES
permits." Standards for NPDES permits are set on an industry-by-industry basis, depending on
the technology that is available to the particular industries. Technology-based requirements are
easier to set because all that is required is an assessment of the available technology.
57. Such a situation might arise when there is significant nonpoint source pollution or where
there are many point sources. The CWA does not directly regulate nonpoint source pollution.
Thus, where there is significant runoff from agricultural or silvicultural operations, technology-
based restrictions on point sources would be insufficient. Another problem occurs where there
are many point sources, each following a general technology-based limitation and discharging
into a single body of water. Cumulatively, they may discharge more pollutants than the water
body can absorb without degradation. Technology-based limits are inadequate in these
circumstances, because they do not take into account the characteristics of a particular body of
water or the number or volume of other dischargers into that body of water.
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C). Water-quality-based standards are those discharge standards
which are necessary to protect designated uses. The uses of a particular body of water are set
by the state. At a minimum, the uses must include fishing and swimming. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2). For an explanation of why these standards are difficult to implement, see Oliver
A. Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L. REV. 358,
389 (1988).
59. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A).
60. Id.
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each body of water in that order.6' The Act requires each state to
submit.its priority-ranked list of water bodies and corresponding
TMDLs to the EPA Administrator by June 26, 1979.62 The Admin-
istrator must either approve or reject each state's submission within
thirty days.' If the Administrator rejects a submission, the Adminis-
trator then has to identify the state's WQL bodies herself and set the
required TMDLs within thirty days of the rejection.'
The CWA does not address what happens if a state fails to
initiate the TMDL process. The Act adopts a dual state-federal
approach toward implementation, with a preference for state
implementation.65 Some courts have held that a long period of state
inaction constitutes a "constructive submission" by the state that no
TMDLs are necessary, thereby triggering the EPA's statutory duties
to review the state's deemed submission.6 This will usually mean
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C). The TMDL should account for seasonal variations and
include a margin of safety. Id.
62. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE 11), 20 F.3d 981, 983 (9th Cir. 1994). The
CWA requires that each state submit the first list of WQL bodies of water and corresponding
TMDLs within 180 days of the date that the EPA promulgated regulations regarding which
pollutants should be considered. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). The EPA did not promulgate the
relevant regulations until December 28, 1978. June 26, 1979 is 180 days later. Scott v.
Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985). The CWA
requires that after a state submits its first list of WQL waters to the EPA, the state shall "from
time to time" submit priority ranked WQL waters and TMDLs to the EPA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)(2).
Only a few states have pursued the required process of listing WQL waters and setting
TMDLs. See, eg., PERCIVAL et al., supra note 8, at 929; Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly
(ACE 1), 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (W.D. Wash. 1991). Alaska was not one, hence this suit. In
a similar suit, citizens in Washington state have filed suit to compel the EPA Administrator to
set TMDLs for water quality limited waters in that state. Amended Complaint, Northwest
Envtl. Advocates v. Browner, No. C91-427R (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 1994). See also Consent
Decree at 3-4, Northwest Environmental Defense Center v. Thomas, No. 86-1578-BU (D. Or.
June 3, 1986) (agreeing to list WQL segments and set TMDLs in Oregon).
63. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
64. Id. It is significant that the Act uses mandatory, nondiscretionary ("shall") language
here. See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
65. This approach is in notable contrast to the Clean 'Air Act and other environmental
statutes which concentrate implementation and enforcement powers in federal agencies. See,
e.g., PERCIVAL, supra note 8, at 894-95. The reason for this may lie in the fact that states have
traditionally regulated water use, and water pollution is frequently perceived of as a local, state
phenomenon. Congress explicitly recognized the states' authority to allocate water and asserted
that "[fqederal agencies shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop comprehensive
solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing
water resources." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
66. E.g., Scott, 741 F.2d at 996; ACE I, 762 F. Supp. at 1429.
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that the EPA rejects the submission that no TMDLs are necessary,'
and the EPA must then identify and priority rank WQL waters in the
state and set the corresponding TMDLs6 Thus, although the CWA
did not explicitly require the EPA to act upon a state's failure to
undertake TMDLs, courts have interpreted the Act's structure and
purpose to require EPA action.
To guarantee that its goals will be achieved, the CWA allows
many parties to enforce its provisions: the EPA ensures that the
states perform their duties,69 and citizens ensure that the EPA
performs its duties.7" As with most environmental statutes,71 the
67. If there are any WQL segments, the state or the EPA should list them and set TMDLs
for them. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C), (d)(2).
68. Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996-98 (7th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1196
(1985); Alaska Ctr, for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Sierra
Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 (D. Minn. 1993).
The analysis that inaction constitutes a constructive submission of TMDLs may also be
applied in the case of limited action by the EPA, as when the EPA partially approves or
partially disapproves a state's submission. By partially approving or disapproving a submission,
the EPA has neither approved nor disapproved the state's submitted list and corresponding
TMDLs as required by the CWA. See id. at 1308; Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE II),
796 F. Supp. 1374, 1375 (W.D. Wash. 1992). By partially approving or disapproving a
submission, the EPA would otherwise be able to effectively disapprove a submission without
triggering its own responsibilities. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (requiring the EPA to review and correct states' work on TMDLs
to ensure that the states protect the waters' uses).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
71. These include the Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993); Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988); Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.C § 1270 (1988); Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 § 105, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1988); Deepwater Ports Act
§ 17,33 U.S.C. 1515 (1988); Public Health Service Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1988); Noise
Control Act of 1972 § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1988); Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 335,
42 U.S.C. § 6305 (1988); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 § 7002, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972 (1988); Clean Air Act § 304,42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 § 725,42 U.S.C. § 8435 (1988); Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 § 310,42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988); Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 1349 (1988).
Four major environmental statutes still do not have citizen suit provisions. These are the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); and
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988-& Supp. V
1993). The first three are framework statutes, and so are arguably more subject to agency
discretion. However, the fourth is a regulatory statute with specific compliance and enforcement
provisions, so its lack of a citizen suit provision is anomalous.
In statutes where Congress did not provide citizen suits, some courts have implied a right
for aggrieved parties to sue based on congressional intent to ensure enforcement. Feld, supra.
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CWA's citizen suit provision allows private citizens to enforce
provisions of the Act.72 Under the Act, any citizen may file suit
against the EPA Administrator where the Administrator has failed to
perform a nondiscretionary act or duty under the CWA.73 The Act
also granted district courts the jurisdiction to compel the Administra-
tor to perform such act or duty.74 Thus, the CWA gave citizens the
role of "private attorneys general" to ensure enforcement of the
CWA's mandates.75
IMl. ALASKA CENTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT V. BROWNER
(ACE HI)
A. Brief History
The CWA required each state to submit to the EPA a priority-
ranked list of WQL waters and corresponding TMDLs by June 26,
1979.76 For more than ten years, the state of Alaska did not submit
any list or TMDLs to the EPA.77 Likewise, the EPA failed to take
any action to list WQL waters or establish TMDLs for Alaska's
waters. Following the required sixty day notice of intent to sue,78
four citizens groups (collectively "ACE") sued in federal district court
to compel the EPA to issue TMDLs for all WQL waters in the state
of Alaska.79
note 34, at 145 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)).
The significance of these provisions is further discussed in subsection IV.C infra.
72. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2). Additionally, any citizen may sue private parties who are
violating their permits. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
75. For a discussion of the role of private attorneys general, see Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1981) (holding that "private
attorneys general" must show injury to establish standing).
76. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). This subsection requires each state to submit its lists "from time
to time," with the first list due not later than 180 days after the publication of pollutants listed
in § 1314(a)(2)(D) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The pollutant list was published on December 28,
1978. June 26,1979 is 180 days later. Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992,996 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1196 (1985).
Courts interpret § 1313(d) as allowing states to identify WQL waters and set TMDLs in a
piecemeal fashion. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE II1), 20 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th
Cir. 1994); Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1314 (D. Minn. 1993).
77. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE 1), 762 F. Supp. 1422,1425 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
78. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
79. ACE I, 762 F. Supp. at 1423, 1425.
[Vol. 6:157
ALASKA CENTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
In response to a motion for partial summary judgment in ACE
1, 0 the district court held that the state of Alaska's long-term failure
to submit any TMDLs constituted a "constructive submission" of no
TMDLs, triggering the EPA's nondiscretionary duty to promulgate
TMDLs.8 The district court concluded that the EPA needed to
initiate its own TMDL process. 2 Since the court ruled on a partial
summary judgment motion, it postponed resolving the precise scope
of the EPA's duties.
81
Subsequently, ACE moved to compel the EPA to perform its
nondiscretionary CWA duties,' specifically requesting a statewide
remedy." The EPA moved for partial summary judgment to limit
the scope of the remedy to those bodies of water for which ACE had
established standing.86 The district court, in an unpublished order,
held that the defendants had confused the "standing requirements [of
injury in fact and redressability] with the ultimate scope of the court's
remedy." In ACE 11,88 the district court granted a statewide
injunction compelling the EPA to promulgate TMDLs for Alaska. 9
In ACE III, the Ninth Circuit affirmed -ACE 1,"' similarly noting
that the EPA had confused the requirements of standing with scope
of remedy.9' The Ninth Circuit specifically held that ACE had
80. Id. at 1423.
81. Id. at 1426-29. The court used the Seventh Circuit's constructive submission language
from Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1196
(1985). ACE 1, 762 F. Supp. at 1426. The nondiscretionary duty to promulgate TMDLs is at
33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
82. ACE I, 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
83. Id. The court wished to work out the details with the parties at a future date. Id.
84. For a more complete analysis of what consistutes a "nondiscretionary act or duty," see
infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
85. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE I1), 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1376 (W.D. Wash.
1992).
86. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE II), 20 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1994).
87. Standing Order, supra note 1, at 10.
88. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE II), 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
89. Id. at 1381. For the entire remedy that the district court granted, see infra note 148 and
accompanying text. The court held that the nature of the CWA requirements and the equities
of the case justified a statewide remedy, noting "The only 'consistently held interpretation' that
the EPA has demonstrated with respect to the CWA's TMDL requirements has been to ignore
them." ACE 11, 796 F. Supp. at 1379.
90. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE II), 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994).
91. Id. at 984.
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standing to sue for a statewide remedy92 and that the trial court had
not abused its discretion by granting a statewide remedy.9'
B. Scope of Statutory Violation in ACE III
The first step in this Note's three-step analysis is to determine the
scope of the wrongful action. This step is particularly significant in
ACE I because the analyses of standing and remedy depend upon
whether the EPA violated a duty to undertake the TMDL process for
Alaska or whether the EPA violated the separate duties of listing
individual WQL bodies of water and setting TMDLs for those waters.
If the former is true, the plaintiff can seek a statewide remedy; if the
latter is true, the plaintiff can only seek remedies for those bodies of
water for which the plaintiff has standing. Ultimately, the scope of
the EPA's failure to act depends on the nature of the statutory
duty.9
4
ACE alleged that the EPA violated a discrete nondiscretionary
duty by failing to promulgate "TMDLs for Alaska and that this
violation caused ACE's injury. Under section 303(d)(2) of the CWA,
each state must submit to the EPA Administrator priority-ranked lists
of WQL waters and corresponding TMDLs "from time to time."95
Subsequently, the Administrator "shall" determine whether to
approve the submission, and the Administrator "shall" identify the
appropriate waters and set TMDLs for the waters if she rejects the
state's submission. 96  Courts generally interpret the imperative
"shall" in a statute as imposing a nondiscretionary duty,97 especially
92. Id at 984-86.
93. IL at 986-87.
94. Sunstein, supra note 23, at 63 (arguing that for standing purposes, injuries cannot be
identified without reference to positive law).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
96. The relevant statutory language reads
The Administrator shall either approve or disapprove such identification and load not
later than thirty days after the date of submission .... If the Administrator disapproves
such identification and load, he shall not later than thirty days after the date of such
disapproval identify such waters in such State and establish such loads for such waters
as he determines necessary to implement the water quality standards applicable to such
waters ....
Id. (emphasis added).
97. See, e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE 1) 762 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (W.D.
Wash. 1991). What constitutes a "nondiscretionary act or duty" has been extensively litigated.
Usually the court will look at the plain language of the statute. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984). In such an analysis, the court will look
for mandatory language like "shall" or discretionary language such as "may." See, e.g., South
Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 130 (D.S.C. 1978) (stating that
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when the statute's primary purpose is the protection of public or
private rights.9" The EPA objected that imposing a nondiscretionary
duty on the EPA to promulgate TMDLs when a state fails to do so
goes beyond the clear language of the statute.99 Both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the EPA had a
mandatory duty to take affirmative action if a state failed to submit
a list or any TMDLs.'"
Having established that the EPA had a mandatory duty, the
Ninth Circuit then sought to define the scope of the duty. The court
observed that "the CWA imposes no narrower obligation" on the
Administrator than to establish TMDLs for the entire state.1 1 Of
particular importance to the court was the priority ranked list of
WQL water bodies that determines the order in which TMDLs are set
within a state."° The court reasoned that it would frustrate congres-
sional intent "to permit individual plaintiffs or a federal court to deal
with only a fraction of the waters and, in effect, impose their own
prioritization upon the EPA by limiting the scope of an ordered
"statutory language that an act 'shall' be carried out is generally regarded as mandatory"). See
also Illinois ex rel. Scott v. Hoffman, 425 F. Supp. 71, 77 (S.D. Ill. 1977) (holding "shall" in § 309
of the CWA imposes a mandatory duty on the EPA Administrator to take appropriate
enforcement actions when a violation exists). But cf. Committee for Consideration of Jones
Falls Sewage Sys. v: Train, 387 F.Supp. 526,529 (D. Md. 1975) (holding that § 1364 of the CWA
is discretionary because the statute uses the word "may" and decisions whether to prosecute
have traditionally been a matter of executive discretion).
98. South Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. at 130 (stating that "where
the statute's purpose is the protection of public or private rights, as opposed to merely providing
guidance for government officials, courts usually interpret 'shall' as imposing mandatory rather
than directory duties"). Since the TMDL section of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d), is meant
to protect public health and welfare, the duties imposed on the EPA Administrator using "shall"
are mandatory. For that matter, the primary purpose of the CWA, and most environmental
laws, is to ensure that the public is free from unwarranted pollution and to protect the quality
of the environment. These are private and public rights, and statutory language including
"shall" should be interpreted to impose mandatory duties.
99. ACE 1, 762 F. Supp. at 1427-28.
100. See id. at 1429; Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE 111), 20 F.3d 981, 983 (9th
Cir. 1994).
101. ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 985. The court cited 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2): "'If the administrator
disapproves [the State's identification of TMDLs], he shall.. . identify such waters in each state
.... "' (emphasis added by the court). Id.
102. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) requires that the ranked list account for "the severity of the
pollution and the uses to be made of such waters." ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 985. See also Di-
oxin/Organochlorine Ctr. v. Rasmussen, No. C93-33D, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15595, at *22
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 1993) (holding that the EPA can set TMDLs one pollutant at a time and
one WQL water body at a time, that requiring the EPA to address all TMDL requirements for
a WQL segment before progressing to the next TMDL would frustrate the prioritized approach
to remediate the worst pollution problems first).
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remedy to specific streams of paramount concern to the parties before
the court."' 3 The Ninth Circuit concluded, "for CWA regulatory
purposes, all waters within a state are interrelated."'O' Thus, the
EPA had a mandatory duty to list WQL waters, priority rank the list,
and set TMDLs for the entire state of Alaska.. Consequently, the,
EPA's TMDL duty was a discrete duty to undertake the TMDL
process for the entire state of Alaska, not a composite of separate
duties.'0°
As discussed earlier, the scoping step of this Note's three-step
analysis is critical to properly framing subsequent issues because the
scope of the action serves as the referent of the arguments. Does the
plaintiff have standing with respect to the underlying action? Is the
underlying action justiciable and ripe? What are the merits of the
underlying action? What is the appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs
with respect to the underlying action? To determine the scope of the
underlying action, it is necessary to examine the positive law at
issue."' In ACE III, the underlying action was the EPA's failure
to undertake the TMDL process for WQL waters in the state of
Alaska. Thus, the statewide nondiscretionary TMDL duty will serve
as the touchstone for the analyses of standing and of the appropriate
scope of the remedy.
103. ACE Ii, 20 F.3d at 985.
104. Id. It is significant that the court did not base its state-wide remedy on the physical
interrelatedness of the "hydrologic cycle." For an explanation of the hydrologic cycle, see, e.g.,
G. TYLER MILLER, JR., LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCrION TO ENVIRONMEN-
TAL SCIENCE 104-06 (7th ed. 1992). Rather, the court found that the statutory structure and
language suggested that Congress preferred a state-wide remedy when it crafted the CWA. To
apply a physical interconnectedness reasoning would be a substantial departure from the legal
analysis of. (1) was the plaintiff injured?; (2) what did the defendant do or fail to do that caused
plaintiff's injury?; and (3) based on the injury and the cause of the injury, what is the equitable
remedy? To use the interconnectedness of a biological or physical system as the basis for
granting a remedy would approach judicial legislating of what constitutes a remediable injury,
a serious infringement on congressional power and a violation of separation of powers.
105. Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit articulated the duty in these precise
terms. However, the district court recognized that the EPA needed to identify and prioritize
the WQL waters in Alaska and set TMDLs for the state, all of which indicates a discrete state-
wide duty that consists of many components. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE II),
796 F.Supp. 1374, 1375, 1378-81 (W.D. Wash. 1992). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily
on priority ranking the list and setting the TMDLs according to the list. Alaska Ctr. for the
Env't v. Browner (ACE II), 20 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit also noted that
the cause of the injury was the violation of a state-wide duty: "[ACE's] injury is the result of
the EPA's failure to comply with the CWA to establish TMDLs for the state of Alaska." Id.
106. See Sunstein, supra note 23, at 63.
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C. 'Standing in ACE III
Once a court determines the scope of the action, the second step
in the analysis is for the court to determine whether the plaintiff has
standing to pursue the action. In ACE I, the disputed action was
the EPA's failure to perform its nondiscretionary statutory TMDL
duty for the WQL waters in Alaska. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
needed to determine whether ACE had standing to challenge the
EPA's violation of a discrete statewide duty. By using this Note's
three-step analysis, the number of waters for which ACE has standing
is irrelevant to the question of standing itself so long as ACE has
standing for at least one water body. The breadth of ACE's injury is
relevant only to the appropriate scope of the remedy. Simply put, if
a plaintiff has standing for a component of a discrete action, then the
plaintiff has standing for the action; the plaintiff need not show injury
in fact for the entire scope of the action."
107. The EPA challenged ACE's ability to meet its standing requirement, by relying on three
cases: (1) Conservation Law Foundation v. Reilly (CLE), 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991); (2) Lujan
v. National wildlife Federation (NWF), 497 U.S. 871 (1990); and (3) People for the Ethical
Treatment of Animals v. Department of Health & Human Services (PETA), 917 F.2d 15 (9th
Cir. 1990). In CLF, the plaintiffs sought to compel the EPA Administrator to complete its
nationwide assessment and evaluation of hazardous waste sites. The First Circuit held that
although the plaintiffs had standing for ten sites in New England, their injury in fact did not
warrant nationwide relief because the plaintiffs suffered injury only at the ten sites. CL, 950
F.2d at 41. In NWF, the plaintiffs challenged the administration of the Bureau of Land
Management's (BLM) "land withdrawal review program," which included roughly 1,250
individual actions performed pursuant to the program. The Supreme Court held that the
program did not "refer to a single BLM order or regulation, or even to a completed universe
of particular BLM orders and regulations." NWF, 497 U.S. at 890. Consequently, the program
did not constitute a discrete action which the plaintiffs could challenge. In PETA, the Ninth
Circuit denied standing to animal activists who sued federal agencies for failure to prepare
environmental impact statements before awarding research grants to institutions that conducted
animal research. The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish injury sufficient to
confer standing to sue, because PETA's claim of injury was too speculative. PETA, 917 F.2d
at 17.
In citing CLF, NWF, and PETA, the EPA attempted to prove that ACE did not have
standing for a statewide remedy. The EPA implicitly argued that the duty was not statewide;
therefore, ACE needed to show standing for every body of water to receive a statewide remedy.
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments. The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the statute in CLF as not imposing a priority ranking and, therefore, less likely to
constitute a discrete duty to act nationwide. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE III),
20 F.3d 981, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1994). In ACE Ill, the Ninth Circuit distinguished NWF and
PETA as cases that declined to grant standing because the plaintiffs had failed to establish any
injury in fact; in neither NWF nor PETA did the court limit the scope of the remedy granted
based on the plaintiffs' standing. Id. at 986 n.3. Thus, CLF, NWF, and PETA did not require
a court to limit ACE's remedy to those bodies of water for which they established standing.
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A plaintiff who is in fact a group or organization presents
additional problems for determination of standing to bring suit. An
organization may establish standing to sue through representational
standing or informational standing.0" ACE, an organization with
members throughout Alaska, tried both avenues and ultimately
proved representational standing to the Ninth Circuit's satisfac-
tion."' 9
To establish representational standing-standing to represent its
members' interests-an organization must show that (1) the interests
that the organization seeks to protect are related to the organization's
purpose, (2) neither the claim nor the requested remedy needs the
organization's members to participate, and (3) the organization's
members have standing to sue." ° The third requirement comprises
the test for individual standing described in section ll.C as having
three components: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability."'
ACE satisfied all the requirements necessary to show representa-
tional standing. The interests that ACE sought to protect-clean
water in Alaska-were germane to their organizational goal of
protecting the Alaskan environment. The CWA claim did not require
individualized proof so the court could properly resolve it in a group
context. Thus, ACE satisfied the first two requirements of represen-
tational standing. To establish the final element, ACE needed to
prove that its members had standing to sue. Specifically, ACE had
to show that its members suffered injury in fact that was traceable to
Instead, the statutory language and congressional intent of the CWA support the finding that
there was a discrete duty to establish TMDLs for WQL waters in each state.
108. Commentators and courts debate the validity of informational standing. Lawrence
Gerschwer, Informational Standing under NEPA: Justiciability and the Environmental
Decisionmaking Process, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 996 (1993) (arguing for recognition of
informational standing in NEPA cases); Matthew C. Porterfield, Agency Action, Finality and
Geographical Nexus: Judicial Review of Agency Compliance with NEPA's Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement Requirement After Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 28 U.
RIcH. L. REv. 619, 642 n.129 (1994) (highlighting the uncertain legal status of informational
standing in light of recent court rulings). However, representational standing is well established.
See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1977)
(holding that a statutory agency that promotes and protects the interests of the Washington State
apple industry may represent its member's interests in a suit challenging a North Carolina
statute restricting sale and transport of apples); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,511 (1975) (noting
that an association can have standing as a representative of its members even if the association
itself has not suffered injury).
109. See ACE III, 20 F.3d at 984-85.
110. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.
111. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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the EPA's failure to set TMDLs in Alaska and could be redressed by
a favorable court decision.
1. Injury in fact. To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must
show that he suffered an injury to a legally protected interest-the
injury must be concrete and particularized, and the injury must be
actual or imminent."' Six members of ACE averred that they used
ten named streams and many unnamed streams in Alaska; and
that water pollution impaired their use and enjoyment of those
streams."' The CWA explicitly protects recreational uses,' 5 and
the Supreme Court has recognized impaired recreational, environmen-
tal, and aesthetic values as injury in fact."6 Thus, ACE's members
had a legally protected interest in clean water. The injury was
concrete and actual because. ACE's members suffered ongoing
impaired use and enjoyment of the waters. Therefore, ACE's
members suffered injury in fact for the ten named and many unnamed
bodies of water in Alaska.
Even though ACE established injury in fact as to some bodies of
water, the EPA argued that ACE had not suffered injury in fact for
all the water bodies in the state and, therefore, should not obtain a
statewide injunction."7  The district court and the Ninth Circuit
were unsympathetic. They found that proving injury in fact for all
water bodies would be too heavy a burden for ACE."8  Further-
more, the "[pllaintiffs established that they were adversely affected by
the inadequate water quality of a representative number of waters
throughout the state of Alaska.""' 9 Thus, the Ninth Circuit factored
the breadth of the plaintiff's injury into its analysis of standing.
112. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders), 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
113. Appellee's Response Brief at 20, Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th
Cit. 1994) (No. 92-36825) [hereinafter ACE Reply Brief].
114. ld. at 3. Furthermore, ACE has members in most communities in Alaska who use the
local waters. Standing Order, supra note 1, at 9 n.6.
115. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
116. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,734 (1972).
117. Appellants' Reply Brief at 4-7, Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th
Cir. 1994) (No. 92-36825) [hereinafter EPA Reply Brief].
118. Standing Order, supra note 1, at 7; Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE III), 20
F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1994). Alaska has an estimated 3,000,000 lakes, 170,000,000 acres of
wetlands, 365,000 miles of rivers and streams, and 36,000 coastal miles. Id. (citing Alaska
Department of Environmental Conservation, "Alaska Water Quality Assessment: Section
305(b) Report to the Environmental Protection Agency," at 3 (April 1990)).
119. ACE III, 20 F.3d at 985. See also Standing Order, supra note 1, at 9 n.6 (the plaintiff
organizations have members living in sixty-one Alaskan towns).
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The burden of establishing statewide standing and the breadth of
the plaintiff's injury in fact are irrelevant in determining whether the
plaintiff has standing to challenge a discrete statewide duty. These
findings are more relevant with regard to the scope of the reme-
dy."2 When considering injury in fact and standing, the important
question is whether the plaintiff suffered an injury, not the extent of
the injury. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit found that
ACE's members suffered concrete, particularized injury in fact. Since
injury in fact for a single WQL water body is enough to establish
standing, inquiry into the breadth of the injury was unnecessary.12 1
2. , Traceability. To satisfy traceability, the second requirement
of standing, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct caused
the plaintiff's injury." As for injury in fact, traceability relies on
the scope of the action ascertained in the first step of this Note's
three-step analysis. The conduct in ACE III was the EPA's failure to
list WQL waters and to promulgate TMDLs for the state of Alaska.
Neither party disputed that the plaintiff's injury resulted from poor
water quality, the indirect result of the EPA's failure to promulgate
TMDLs. Once the EPA establishes TMDLs, the load is incorporated
into the NPDES permits for the water body. As a result, poor water
quality may persist until TMDLs are set and implemented. Therefore,
where the EPA has an affirmative duty to set TMDLs for WQL
waters, injury from poor water quality can be traced to the EPA's
failure to perform that duty. On appeal, the EPA did not challenge
the assertion that ACE's injury was traceable to the EPA's inac-
120. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
121. It needs to be emphasized that the breadth of the plaintiff's injury is not irrelevant. It
is highly relevant to determining the appropriate scope of the remedy, particularly where a court
uses equitable discretion. The breadth of injury is also important when determining standing
for many discrete actions, since the plaintiff must establish standing for each discrete action.
However, the breadth of injury is not important when considering standing for a particular
discrete action.
122. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (Defenders), 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992). The
traceability requirement precludes cases where a third party not before the court independently
caused the injury.
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tion,'" and the Ninth Circuit noted that ACE satisfied traceabili-
ty.
124
3. Redressability. To satisfy the standing doctrine's redress-
ability requirement, the relief requested must be likely to redress the
plaintiff's iijury. 5 In ACE III, the plaintiffs claimed that TMDLs,
once established for WQL water bodies, would be incorporated into
NPDES permits, and the water quality would be restored,"2 thereby
redressing ACE's injury."
The EPA countered that ACE's injury was not redressable
because ACE's relief depended upon the actions of a third party-the
State of Alaska.' Under the CWA, states are responsible for
addressing nonpoint source pollution;' 2 and the EPA claimed that
much of the pollution that caused a water body to be WQL came
123. The EPA claimed that ACE's injuries were not likely to be redressed because a third
party (the State of Alaska) was partly responsible for the injury. This argument rested on the
premise that only states can promulgate regulations to control nonpoint source pollution.
Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE III), 20 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1994). Traceability
requires only a causal connection; the complained-of cause need not be the sole cause. See
Block v. Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1309 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986) (writing for
the D.C. Circuit, Justice Scalia held that the government need not be the sole cause of the
plaintiff's injury because standing in fact requires no more than de facto causality). Thus, the
EPA's claim is more appropriately analyzed in the context of redressability.
124. See ACE-III, 20 F.3d at 985.
125. Defenders, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
126. See ACE Reply Brief, supra note 113, at 34-35; supra note 59.
127. Compelling the EPA to set TMDLs for the waters for which ACE established standing
would also redress the plaintiffs injury. This is not the appropriate way to view redressability,
though. The underlying action is the statewide failure to set TMDILs for WQL waters in Alaska.
A favorable decision on the underlying action would redress the plaintiff's injury. For
redressability purposes, it does not matter whether remedying a portion of the underlying action
would redress the plaintiffs injury. Likewise, granting a nationwide remedy would remedy the
plaintiffs injury. The ultimate scope of the remedy should be left to the remedy stage and not
narrowed at the standing stage if the plaintiff has standing for the underlying action.
128. By the plain meaning of the CWA, the EPA Administrator, but not states, may be sued
for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the Act. § 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a)(2). Consequently, the state of Alaska was not a party to the suit.
129. Section 319 of the CWA requires states to prepare assessment reports which identify
waters that do not meet water quality standards due to nonpont pollution and significant sources
of that pollution. 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993). States also have to develop state
management plans that propose methods of reducing nonpoint source pollution and improving
water quality. Id. at § 1329(b). However, the EPA retains 'oversight, and if a state fails to
submit a report, the EPA Administrator shall prepare the report for the state. Id. at
§ 1329(d)(3).
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from nonpoint sources.'30  The EPA relied on Fernandez v.
Brock31 to support its assertion that ACE's injury was not redress-
able without the State of Alaska's presence in the suit.' 2 In Fernan-
dez, the court refused to compel the Secretary of Labor to promulgate
regulations which might affect plaintiffs' eligibility for retirement
benefits. The court reasoned that since any increase in benefits would
be entirely contingent upon the plaintiffs' private employer-a third
party-plaintiffs' relief was purely speculative. 33  In ACE III, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished Fernandez by finding that "Congress and
the EPA have already determined that establishing TMDLs is an
effective tool for achieving water quality standards in waters impacted
by non-point source pollution."" Since TMDLs can address
nonpoint source pollution and since the EPA can set TMDLs, the
court held that the State of Alaska was not a necessary party to the
litigation. 3 ' Therefore, ACE satisfied redressability.
4. Conclusion. ACE established that its members suffered
injury in fact, that the injury was traceable to the EPA's failure to list
WQL waters and set TMDLs, and that a favorable judgment would
redress their injury. Consequently, ACE's members had standing to
sue individually. Since ACE also established that the interests it
sought to protect were aligned with the organization's purpose and"
the claim was appropriately settled in a group context, ACE had
representational standing.
130. Nonpoint source pollution is frequently described as pollution borne by runoff from
agriculture, silviculture, and cities. See PERCIVAL et al., supra note 8, at 944. Because nonpoint
source pollution is a significant portion of the pollution in many Alaskan waters and because
the CWA relegates nonpoint source pollution to the sphere of the states, the EPA argued that
redressing ACE's injury depended upon the State of Alaska's nonpoint source actions.
Appellants' Brief at 26-28, Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994)
(No. 92-36825) [hereinafter EPA Brief]; Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE li), 20 F.3d
981, 984 (9th Cir. 1994).
131. Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiffs did not have
standing to compel the Secretary of Labor to establish regulations that might affect their
eligibility for retirement benefits because their ultimte benefits depended on the actions of the
plaintiffs' private employer).
132. ACE 1i, 20 F.3d at 984.
133. See Fernandez, 840 F.2d at 626-28.
134. ACE Ii, 20 F.3d at 985. The Ninth Circuit did not expand on this conclusion.
135. See id. at 984-85.
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D. Remedy in ACE III
Once a plaintiff has established standing and the court decides on
the merits that the defendant has unlawfully injured the plaintiff, the
final step is to fashion a remedy.136 The starting point of this final
analysis is the defendant's action or lack thereof' 3 7 From there, a
court may expand or narrow the scope of the injunction, depending
on other relevant factors including the extent of the plaintiff's
injury 3 8
The equitable remedy analysis is frequently a source of confusion,
however. For example, although the Ninth Circuit in ACE III
distinguished between standing and the scope of the remedy,39 the
court wrongly considered the number of water bodies for which ACE
established injury-in-fact in the context of standing.'" Such a
discussion is more appropriately undertaken in the context of the
remedy. Confusion also arises about how to properly weigh the
136. The line between standing and remedy is frequently blurred. In determining whether
an injury is redressable (the third component of standing), a court may look to the remedy
sought to determine redressability. Likewise, in fashioning a remedy, a court needs to ensure
that the remedy is sufficient to redress plaintiff's injury yet not so overly broad as to grant a
remedy to one who does not have a concrete interest that extends as far as the proposed
remedy. This is perhaps the origin of the confusion regarding standing and remedies. The
Supreme Court has asserted that "[case-or-controversy considerations) obviously shade into
those [considerations] determining whether the complaint states a sound basis for equitable relief
.... " O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974). A decade later, the Court further
explained, "[t]he latter set of considerations [regarding equitable relief] should therefore inform
our judgment about whether respondents have standing." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760:61
(1984) (holding that plaintiffs who alleged IRS grant of tax-exempt status to private schools that
discriminated on the basis of race did not have standing to sue since removing the tax-exempt
statuts would not force the schools to desegregate). This seems like an intentional smudging of
the line, but the Court only applied it in a classic separation of powers case where the plaintiffs
sought to restructure an "apparatus established by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal
duties" rather than "enforce specific legal obligations whose violation works a direct harm." Id.
at 761.
137. This is where the scoping action in the first step of this Note's three-step analysis
becomes particularly relevant. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682,702 (1979) ("[T]he scope of
injunctive relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical
extent of the plaintiff class"); Farber, supra note 22, at 538-44 (focusing the analysis of
injunctions on the nature of the underlying legal duty).
138. For other relevant factors to consider when reviewing a request for injunctive relief, see
infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text.
139. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE 11), 20 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 1994) ("the
defendants had confused the standing requirements of injury in fact and redressability with the
ultimate scope of the court's remedy").
140. Id. at 985-86.
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different factors to achieve an equitable result. 4' Ultimately, a
court must decide what is "fair" to arrive at an equitable result. 42
1. Remedy Granted by the District Court in ACE IlI. In July
1990, three months after ACE filed suit, Alaska submitted a list of 48
WQL waters to the EPA.'43 The EPA partially approved the list on
September 10, 1991, requesting more information about additional
suspected WQL water bodies.'" Subsequently, the EPA and the
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation signed a
memorandum of understanding regarding TMDL implementation in
Alaska on January 27, 1992.4"
In determining the scope of the remedy, the district court
considered the schedule for setting TMDLs in'the memorandum of
understanding, the EPA's self-imposed limitations,146 the extended
period of inaction, congressional intent for prompt action, and general
principles of equity" With these considerations in mind, the
141. See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text (discussing fairness and general
"balancing"). What constitutes an equitable result is also uncertain. Generally, an equitable
result arises not out of established principles, but rather from "common sense and socially
acceptable notions of fair play." SHOBEN & TABB, supra note 53, at 4. This presents a problem
in a heterogeneous society: whose common sense and notions of fair play set the standard? See
JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK 46 (Edward Arber ed., 1972) (1st ed. 1689) ("Equity is a Roguish
thing, for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to, Equity is according to [the]
Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one
as if they should make the Standard the measure we call a Chancellors Foot, what an uncertain
measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Fobt, a third an
indifferent Foot. 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellors Conscience.").
142. This Note attempts to aid courts in achieving equitable results by clarifying the analysis
by which courts approach the cases before them. Hopefully, this will lead to better reasoned
opinions, thereby reducing the possibility of an inequitable or confusing result.
143. Administrative actions can bar citizen suits. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A) (1988 & Supp.
1993). However, since the citizen suit was filed before the administrative action, the
administrative action does not bar the citizen suit from proceeding. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B)(i).
See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text (discussing whether an administrative action moots
a citizen suit).
144. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE I), 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1375-76 (W.D.Wash.
1992). This was more than a year after the statutory thirty-day deadline for approval or
disapproval. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2). ACE contended that by partially approving Alaska's
list, the EPA sought to avoid triggering its § 1313(d)(2) statutory duty to promulgate its own list
of WQL water bodies and corresponding TMDLs. Thus, ACE requested that the court compel
the EPA to make its final approval or disapproval. ACE II, 796 F. Supp. at 1377-78.
145. ACE II, 796 F. Supp. at 1376.
146. The limitations were primarily budgetary. However, these were self-imposed as the
EPA did not request funds for its TMDLs program for fiscal year 1992. Id. at 1379 n.8.
147. See ACE II, 796 F. Supp. at 1375-81.
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district court granted ACE its requested injunction." The court
ordered the EPA to approve or reject Alaska's submission. If it
rejected Alaska's list, the Court required the EPA to promulgate its
own list of WQL waters, to set a schedule for promulgating TMDLs,
to submit a report on ambient water quality monitoring, and to set a
schedule for implementing the appropriate measures of the report. 49
The EPA needed to complete all the requirements in accordance with
an agreed-upon schedule.'
2. Review of the Remedy. A court should grant injunctive
relief only when a plaintiff has suffered or could suffer irreparable
injury and when legal remedies are inadequate.' Environmental
injuries are prime candidates for injunctive relief, because the injuries
are frequently irreparable and money damages are usually inadequate.
Despite, or perhaps due to, courts' willingness to grant injunctive
relief, the litigants frequently debate the scope of the injunction.'52
Depending upon the equitable factors of the case, injunctive relief
may be broad in scope, or it may be limited to the plaintiff's
particular injury.
When courts grant equitable relief, they have extensive discretion
in fashioning an appropriate remedy. 3  The trial court may consid-
148. Id. at 1381-82.
149. The precise remedy that the district court granted and the Ninth Circuit upheld is: (1)
the EPA shall review Alaska's revised April of 1992 list and priority ranking of water quality
limited segments and, within 90 days of April 1, 1992, the EPA shall either approve or
disapprove the list; (2) in the event that the EPA disapproves Alaska's list, the EPA shall
promulgate its own list and priority ranking of water quality segments within 30 days of
disapproval; (3) within 90 days of the EPA's approval or disapproval of Alaska's list of water
quality limited segments, the EPA shall propose a schedule for the establishment of TMDLs for
all waters designated as water quality limited; (4) within one year of the EPA's approval or
disapproval of Alaska's list of water quality limited segments, the EPA shall submit to the court
its report on ambient water quality monitoring; (5) within 30 days of the submission of the
report, the EPA shall propose a schedule for the implementation of those measures identified
as appropriate and practicable in its report; and, (6) two years from [June 2, 1992], the parties
shall submit to the court a joint status report, on which basis the court shall determine whether
to retain jurisdiction for an additional period. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE 11), 796
F. Supp. 1374, 1381-82 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
150. In the memorandum of understanding with the Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation, the EPA had agreed to most of the deadlines that the district court imposed. Id.
at 1378. The district court simply held the EPA to its own schedule.
151. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982).
152. See, e.g., Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE II1), 20 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir.
1994).
153. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192,200 (1973) ("In shaping equity decrees, the trial
court is vested with broad discretionary power, appellate review is correspondingly narrow");
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er "what-is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable,"'" balance
public and private interests, 15  account for equitable defenses,156
and examine the requirements and intent of the governing statute.15 7
A trial court may also consider good-faith efforts of the parties to
comply with their respective obligations.5 These concerns may
narrow, but not expand, the remedy) 59  Further, prudential consid-
erations of overbreadth and vagueness act only to constrain the
court's remedial powers."6 Taken together, these factors ensure
that a remedy is equitable by being neither too narrow nor too broad.
Despite the broad discretion afforded the trial court, the injunction
must nevertheless be sufficiently narrow to give only the relief to
which the plaintiff is entitled. 6'
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the EPA objected to the trial
court's order in ACE II granting statewide injunctive relief on
multiple grounds. The EPA contended that the district court abused
its discretion by granting a statewide remedy including long-term and
Orantes-Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549,558 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Once plaintiffs establish
they are entitled to injunctive relief, the district court has broad discretion in fashioning a
remedy"). Because trial courts have equitable discretion when granting an injunction, the
standard of review is abuse of discretion when an appellate court reviews an order granting or
denying an injunction. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320.
154. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. at 200 (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing Pennsylvania to reimburse schools for costs incurred relying on a statutory
scheme that was later invalidated).
155. See grown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (balancing the plaintiffs'
interest in nondiscriminatory admission to public schools against the interest of school systems
in regulating their own affairs); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-31 (1944) (balancing the
public and the Administrator's interests in controlling inflation to determine whether injunctive
relief is warranted under § 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942).
156. California v. American Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271,296 (1990) ("[E]quitable defenses such
as laches, or perhaps 'unclean hands,' may protect consummated transactions from belated
attacks by private parties when it would not be too late for the Government to vindicate the
public interest").
157. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 318 (1982).
158. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
159. A plaintiff may not seek a remedy beyond the plaintiff's legal injury in fact. See supra
section II.C on standing.
160. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317 (1967) (questioning the breadth and
vagueness of an injunction banning demonstrations and parades without a city permit).
161. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). In a case dealing with recouping
overpayment of Social Security benefits, the Court held that nationwide class relief is not.
inconsistent with the principle that the remedy should be limited to that which is necessary to
provide complete relief to the plaintiff, since "the scope of injunctive relief is dictated by the
extent of the, violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff 'class." Id. But
see Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978 F.2d 504, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding an injunc-
tion overly broad because it did not specifically define what activities were banned).
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short-term timetables and a report on the adequacy of water quality
monitoring in Alaska. 62 Specifically, the EPA asserted that: (1) the
remedy should not be statewide;1'3 (2) the timetables were beyond
the court's power to set;" and (3) the requested report was exces-
sive since the CWA did not require it."5
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the EPA on all three
counts." In its standing analysis, the court observed that the EPA
failed to perform its mandatory duty of establishing TMDLs for the
state of Alaska and that this inaction injured the plaintiffs. 67
Furthermore, since the plaintiffs resided throughout the state,'1 the
public interests, the statutory obligations, and the extent of the injury
show that a statewide remedy was within the court's discretion.'69
The conduct at issue in ACE III was the EPA's failure to
establish TMDLs for Alaska following the State's inaction.' 70 The
court held that the EPA's duty was discrete, nondiscretionary, and
statewide in scope. Accordingly, the claim and the relief granted
should have focused on this statewide action.
The district court's short-term schedule that provided deadlines
for the EPA's TMDL actions was the agreed-upon schedule set forth
in the EPA's memorandum of understanding with Alaska.' The
schedule was less stringent than the timetable set out in section
162. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE III), 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994). For
the precise remedy granted, see supra note 149.
163. EPA Reply Brief, supra note 117, at 4-7.
164. IdL at 17-18. The EPA claimed that the CWA left the pace at which TMDLs are set
to their discretion. Id. at 16-17. However, the district court observed, "The only 'consistently
held interpretation' that the EPA has demonstrated with respect to the CWA's TMDL
requirements has been to ignore them. Such 'interpretation' is clearly not 'reasonable'.....
Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE I1), 796 F. Supp. 1374,1379 (W.D. Wash. 1992). EPA
further objected that the court did not have power to require good.cause to deviate from the
schedule. See id. at 1380.
165. EPA Reply Brief, supra note 117, at 20-24.
166. ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 986-87.
167. As discussed supra section II.B, such an analysis is more applicable in the context of
the appropriate scope of the remedy.
168. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE 111), 20 F.3d 981,985-86 (9th Cir. 1994).
The district court noted that the plaintiffs had members in 61 towns throughout Alaska.
Standing Order, supra note I at 9-10, n.6 (citing Exhibit A, Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment).
169. See ACE III, 20 F.3d at 985-86.
170. "In this case the established wrong is the failure of the EPA to take any steps to
establish the TMDLs mandated by Congress for more than a decade." ACE II1, 20 F.3d at 986.
171. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE I1), 796 F. Supp. 1371,1378 (W.D.Wash. 1992).
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303(d)(2) of the CWA.P Because the trial court did not require a
schedule that was more strict than either the EPA or Congress had
approved, the trial court's schedule was not unduly burdensome on
the EPA. 3  The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in requiring a short-term schedule for establishing
TMDLs of waters listed in the State's submission.'7 4
The Ninth Circuit similarly upheld the district court's long-term
schedule for setting TMDLs in the state of Alaska, even though the
schedule was not required by the CWA, 75 emphasizing the con-
gressional intent in passing the CWAY'6 "[T]o ensure prompt and
attentive adherence to the mandate of the CWA"' 7 and in light of
the EPA's chronic inaction,"8 the district court had the power to set
a reasonable compliance schedule.'79 It chose, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed, to hold the EPA to a long-range schedule of setting TMDLs
that the EPA set for itself in the memorandum of understanding with
Alaska.Y Further, both courts recognized that the EPA would
172. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't (ACE 111), 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994). The CWA
requires that the Administrator either approve or disapprove the proposed identification of
WQL waters and the corresponding TMDLs within 30 days of the date of submission. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(d)(2). If the Administrator disapproves the submission, he has 30 days from the date of
disapproval in which to identify WQL waters and establish the corresponding TMDLs. Id. The
short-term schedule allows the EPA 90 days to approve or disapprove the already submitted list
of WQL water segments. ACE I, 796 F. Supp. at 1381. If it disapproves the ist, the EPA has
30 days to promulgate its own list. Id. Finally, the EPA has 90 days from the date of its
approval or disapproval in which to set a schedule for establishing TMDLs for the listed waters.
Id. In all cases, the deadlines are no more stringent than required by the CWA.
173. Id.
174. See ACE II, 20 F.3d at 986.
175. ACE 111, 20 F. 3d at 986.
176. See ACE I, 796 F. Supp. at 1379; ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 986.
177. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE I1), 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (W.D. Wash.
1992).
178. Ten years after the statutory deadline, when ACE filed suit, neither the State of Alaska
nor the EPA had set a single TMDL for Alaskan waters. Even after the suit was filed, neither
the State of Alaska nor the EPA made any reasonable efforts to establish any TMDLs,
ultimately resulting in a thirteen-year delinquency. See ACE 11, 796 F. Supp. at 1377-80.
179. "When the intent of Congress clearly requires the Agency to act without ufidue delay,
courts have the authority to order the EPA to establish a reasonable schedule in which to
achieve compliance." Id. at 1379.
180. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE 111), 20 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1994).
The district court noted, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that the memorandum of understanding
was insufficient to fully comply with the CWA. ACE , 796 F. Supp. at 1379; ACE 111, 20 F.3d
at 987. Consequently, a long-range schedule was an appropriate remedy.
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have discretion in determining the substance and manner in which it
would achieve compliance with the CWA."'8
The district court and the Ninth Circuit utilized a similar analysis
in ordering the report on water quality monitoring. They considered
the congressional objectives of the CWA,'" the EPA's long-standing
recalcitrance with respect to TMDLs in Alaska," and the nature of
equitable discretion." The courts concluded that the report was
necessary to establish TMDLs in Alaska and that it did not unduly
infringe on the EPA's discretion. 8a
By balancing the private and public interests at stake and
accounting for good faith compliance efforts, the district court and the
Ninth Circuit both concluded that a broad remedy was appropriate.
Since the underlying action was a statewide duty, the courts granted
a statewide remedy that forced the EPA to form long-term and short-
term timetables, as well as a report on the adequacy of water quality
monitoring in Alaska."6 Despite its breadth, the court's remedy left
the manner and substance of achieving compliance to the EPA,
thereby protecting the public interest in clean water while respecting
the EPA's power to decide how to pursue its obligations.
E. Mootness in ACE III
A case is moot when there is no longer a "live" case or contro-
versy,"s meaning a favorable decision would not benefit the plain-
tiff, or the plaintiff no longer has a legally cognizable interest in the
181. ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 986-87; ACE 11, 796 F. Supp. at 1379; cf Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation (NWIF), 497 U.S. 871, 893 (1990) (holding that a plaintiff generally cannot seek
wholesale changes in a program, but must sue on particular actions). The Ninth Circuit did not
directly address the EPA's contention that requiring leave of the court to deviate from the
schedule infringed on the EPA's discretion. However, the court upheld the district court's
schedule, and thereby implicitly supported the restriction on deviating from the schedule that
the EPA set. The remedy allowed the EPA to deviate from the long-range schedule when the
EPA could show good cause. ACE 11, 796 F. Supp. at 1380. This is a reasonable balance
between the requirements that are necessary to ensure the development of TMDLs in Alaska
and the substantive and procedural discretion that the EPA has in setting and ordering TMDLs.
182. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE 1), 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (W.D. Wash.
1992); Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE 111), 20 F.3d 981, 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1994).
183. ACE 11, 796 F. Supp. at 1378-79; ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 983.
184. ACE 11, 796 F. Supp. at 1376-77; ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 986.
185. See ACE I, 796 F. Supp. at 1380-81; ACE II, 20 F.3d at 986-87.
186. See supra note 149 for the lull remedy granted by the district court in ACE I.
187. E.g., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478,481 (1982) (per curiam) (noting that plaintiffs claim
to pretrial bail would be moot if he were convicted).
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case."s  Three months after ACE filed suit, the State of Alaska
submitted a list of proposed WQL waters that the EPA subsequently
conditionally approved." 9 Thereafter, the EPA and the State signed
a memorandum of understanding regarding TMDLs in Alaska."9
Signing the memorandum of understanding to list WQL waters and
set TMDLs in Alaska arguably satisfied ACE's needs. The Adminis-
trator could have argued that these good faith actions subsequent to
the suit's commencement mooted ACE's claim. The court could have
found the case moot and that it was unnecessary to compel the EPA
to establish TMDLs for Alaska. 9' However, the trial court in ACE
11 reasonably believed that the EPA would not act in a timely manner
and would continue to violate its statutory duty to ensure that
TMDLs were promulgated for Alaska."9 Since the court did not
believe that the EPA would appropriately perform its duties, it held
that ACE still had a legally cognizable interest in the outcome of the
case, thereby avoiding the mootness problem. So, even though the
State of Alaska and the EPA had arguably commenced the TMDL
process satisfying their CWA duties, it was within the district court's
discretion to impose the statewide injunction because neither party
was necessarily making a bona fide effort to comply with the CWA.' 9
188. See id. at 481-82.
189. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE 11), 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1375-76 (W.D. Wash.
1992); see also supra note 68.
190. ACE II, 796 F.Supp. at 1376.
191. See Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Minn. 1993) (mooting plaintiffs claim
where neither the state of Minnesota nor the EPA had set any TMDLs for thirteen years, the
citizens had suffered injury in fact throughout the state's waters, the state had submitted lists of
WQL waters, the EPA had partially rejected the final list, and the EPA and Minnesota were
in the process of establishing TMDLs).
192. See ACE II, 796 F. Supp. at 1379. The trim court also noted that the memorandum of
understanding did not ensure that the TMDLs would be established for the waters to be studied
or for any other water quality limited segments. Id at 1378.
193. The Ninth Circuit did not rule on this issue, but the court noted the necessary steps that
the district court imposed on the EPA to achieve compliance with the CWA. Alaska Ctr. for
the Env't v. Browner (ACE Il), 20 F.3d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir. 1994). Since an injunction is an
equitable remedy, equitable factors including the parties' good faith efforts are important.
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (holding that "courts will have to
consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles" and "[t]he burden rests upon the defendants to establish that
[extra time to carry out the ruling in an effective manner] is necessary in the public interest and
is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date"); see generally SHOBEN
& TABn, supra note 53, at 115 (equitable remedies account for equitable defenses).
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While the CWA provides that administrative actions can bar
citizen suits in certain circumstances,'94 the district court properly
declined to dismiss the suit. Because the EPA and the State of
Alaska signed the memorandum of understanding after ACE fied the
citizen suit, the administrative action could not preclude the suit from
going forward. 5 Thus, the claim was neither precluded nor mooted
by administrative actions undertaken subsequent to ACE filing suit.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE-STEP ANALYSIS
A. Potential Problems
There are some potential pitfalls in using this Note's three-step
analytical framework. Potential problems include: "slippery slope"
arguments that the courts might grant too much relief; narrower use
of equitable discretion which would lead courts to grant less relief;
and statutory grants of interest. However, closer inspection shows
that these problems are either phantoms or exist regardless of the
three-step analysis.
The EPA might complain that under this analysis a plaintiff who
could establish standing for one lake would have standing to compel
the EPA to undertake the whole TMDL process for a state.'96
While it is true that even a single plaintiff who is injured on a single
lake would have standing in such a suit, that plaintiff would not
necessarily receive expansive relief. Granting the plaintiff standing
would simply defer to the remedy stage the determination of whether
the court should award a statewide remedy or a waterbody-specific
remedy. In exercising its equitable discretion, the court could easily
balance the public and private interests and simply grant an injunction
compelling the EPA to set TMDLs for the single body of water for
which the plaintiff had standing.97 Used in this manner, equitable
194. Administrative actions preclude citizen suit actions only when the citizens have not filed
suit in the 120 days after giving notice of intent to sue. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(B).
195. Alaska submitted the initial list three months after ACE filed its citizen suit, and the
EPA and the State did not sign the memorandum of understanding until January 27, 1992, 21
months after ACE filed suit. See Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Reilly (ACE 11), 796 F. Supp.
1374, 1376 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
196. It seems disingenuous for an agency that fails to perform a mandatory statutory duty
to complain when someone invokes a citizen suit provision to compel such action. See Farber,
supra note 23, at 535-36.
197. In this example, some relevant factors in balancing the public and private interests at
stake include the fact that the CWA allows for the use of equitable discretion, it would be
extremely burdensome for the EPA to promulgate TMDLs for the entire state, only one plaintiff
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discretion would encourage potential plaintiffs to seek out many
people who had been harmed in connection with many water
bodies.9 ' This would enhance not only their likelihood of establish-
ing standing but also their chance for statewide relief.' 99 A plaintiff
who has a narrow injury will find it difficult to justify an expansive
remedy on the equities. Thus, critics need not worry about the
existence of a "slippery slope" because the courts have equitable
discretion to determine the appropriate scope of the remedy.
On the other hand, environmentalists might object that emphasiz-
ing the third step (exercising equitable discretion) might make courts
less likely to grant statewide injunctions. This would make it harder
for citizen groups to ensure that the EPA fully performed its
mandatory duties.'m However, courts have always had the power
was claiming to be injured, and the injury was localized to a single lake.
In ACE III, the court talked of a "representative number of waters throughout the state
of Alaska," and the plaintiffs had "demonstrated representation and injury throughout the entire
area for which they seek relief." ACE III, 20 F.3d at 985-86. Similarly, the court in Sierra Club
v. Browner distinguished CLF on the basis that plaintiffs "use a large number of waters
throughout Minnesota" and "they have a personal stake in the quality of waters throughout the
state." 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D. Minn. 1993). The line as to when a court should grant a
statewide injunction and when it should grant an injury-specific injunction is necessarily vague.
There are many factors that enter into the decision, and the number of waters for which the
plaintiffs have established injury is but one factor, albeit an important one.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell stands as a counterweight to a narrow injunction.
Since environmental injury is usually irreparable and not remedied by money damages, the
Supreme Court noted that "the balance of harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction
to protect the environment." Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531,545 (1987). The Supreme Court
did not address how the nature of environmental injury factored into the scope of an injunction.
The Court placed great weight on environmental injury, so environmental injury militates in
favor of a broad injunction. However, in Village of Gambell, the Court rejected the Ninth
Circuits assertion that "[irreparable] damage is presumed" and required the plaintiff to prove
actual injury. ld. at 544-45. In other cases, the court has affirmed remedies that do not protect
the environment. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982).
198. To some extent, plaintiffs already see value in having a large, widespread group of
potential plaintiffs who have been injured by the defendant. See, e.g., Standing Order, supra
note 1, at 9-10 n.6 (four plaintiff organizations represented members in 61 towns and cities
throughout Alaska); Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. at 1306, 1309 (D. Minn. 1993) (four
organizations representing members throughout Minnesota).
199. From a judicial standpoint, trying many claims simultaneously is efficient and it ensures
that the plaintiffs are more likely to accurately represent the interests of the all the injured
parties.
200. If courts exercised their equitable discretion conservatively and consistently limited
relief to the extent of the plaintiff's injury, then public interest groups would be hard-pressed
to pursue their goals of social and environmental reform and protection. Comity or separation
of powers is the primary justification for limiting relief.
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to limit injunctive relief to reflect the equities of a case.20 1 Further-
more, courts do not have unbounded discretion to deny or limit
injunctive relief since their decisions are subject to review. Where the
plaintiffs' injuries are severe or widespread and the burden on the
government agency is relatively minor, balancing the public and
private interests readily favors a large-scale injunction. Consequently,
the fear that courts will be less likely to grant broad injunctions is not
novel to this Note's analysis. In fact, the three-step analysis would
make courts' decisions more transparent by showing that the decision
rested on the equities rather than on standing.'
A more difficult problem arises where statutes give citizens a
broad "right," enforceable by citizen suits. 3 Citizens could then
demand action from the executive branch to remedy situations well
beyond the citizens' injury. This could conflict with the principle of
separation of powers, particularly if the statutory right was so broad
that it essentially allowed private citizens the ability to dictate large-
scale programmatic decisions.' However, courts always have
equitable discretion as to whether and to what extent they will grant
an injunction. The equitable discretion can include factors such as the
comparative extent of the plaintiff's injury, the duties that are
imposed on the defendant, and separation of powers concerns.
201. Equity is one of the oldest doctrines of jurisprudence, and courts have long been
recognized to exert equitable discretion when fashioning equitable remedies including
injunctions.
202. When a court denies standing, the court does not hear arguments on the merits of the
case and does not rule on the merits. Standing can thus.be a convenient, but misused, tool that
allows courts to avoid cases that they do not want to hear. In contrast, granting a narrow
remedy puts the judge on the spot to explain why the court denied more expansive relief.
203. For example, Congress could try to provide that each U.S. citizen has a right to efficient
government and provide for citizen suits to enforce that right.
204. The plaintiffs in such a case would probably lack standing. Courts have justified the
standing requirement as resting on separation of powers concerns. Thus, Justice Scalia has
asserted that where injury is shared by everyone, or even a simple majority, no one has standing
to pursue the claim. If we are to rely on democracy as a political system, Justice Scalia claims,
the majority can always exert their will through the electoral process and control the Legislative
and Executive Branches' actions. Justice Scalia, supra note 35.
There is an irony to a separation of powers justification for courts not to compel an agency
to perform a duty that the legislature has deemed to be nondiscretionary, Le. the law. The irony
is that it preserves the Executive Branch's prerogative on whether to enforce a law at the
expense of the Legislative Branch's right to create the law and the Judicial Branch's duty to
interpret the law, particularly when the Legislative Branch says that in this case, the Executive
does not have discretion whether to enforce the law. Mandatory sentences and sentencing
guidelines are analogous in that the Lgislative Branch has removed or constrained the
Judiciary's traditional role of determining the appropriate sentence.
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Consequently, where a claim infringes on separation of powers, a
court can appropriately limit the scope of the remedy.
Thus, the factors that enter into equitable discretion resolve most
of these potential problems. Delaying these considerations until the
remedy stage may appear to prolong litigation, but considering
equitable factors during the standing stage is inconsistent with the
jurisdictional purpose of the standing requirement. 5
B. Other Areas of Law
Most environmental statutes include citizen suit provisions that
allow private individuals to sue to compel an agency to perform a
nondiscretionary duty under the statute."6 Since these statutes
often establish agency duties that could affect many individuals, cases
that are functionally similar to ACE III are bound to arise. In these
cases, an individual who is injured by an agency's action or inaction
should have standing to compel that agency to perform its nondis-
cretionary duty. Whether the court grants the requested remedy will
be a matter of equitable discretion.
Regardless of whether a statute includes a citizen suit provision,
plaintiffs can always attempt to sue under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).' This will undoubtedly be more difficult,
since the APA requires that the challenged action be a final agency
action.2a When an agency fails to take any action, including a
refusal to take action which would be reviewable under the APA,
205. Standing is a jurisdictional, not an equitable, doctrine. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text. To include an equitable element (e.g., the exteni of the plaintiff's injury or
the burden to the defendant) at the standing stage is to give that element paramount weight in
relation to the other equitable elements. This is inappropriate;Ithe equitable elements should
be considered together and weighed in their totality to determine the appropriate equitable
remedy. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 131 (1983) (noting the "dangers
inherent in any doctrine that permits a court to foreclose any consideration of that remedy by
ruling on the pleadings that the plaintiff lacks standing to seek it").
206. For a complete list of these statutes, see supra note 71.
207. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1994).
208. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1994). In NWF, the plaintiffs sued under the APA but lost because in
addition to not finding injury in fact and traceability, the Supreme Court held that there was no
"identifiable 'final agency action."' Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (NWF) 497 U.S. 871, 890
n.1 (1990). Similarly, in Scott, the Seventh Circuit denied the APA claim, because the plaintiff
did not explain "what agency action is to be reviewed." Scott v. Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996
(7th Cir. 1984). The court went on to hold that the plaintiff stated a valid claim under the
citizen suit provision of the CWA, since there was a "constructive submission" of TMDLs on
which the EPA needed to act. Id. This illustrates one of the problems of trying to compel the
agency to act.
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then a court may find it difficult to identify a final agency action.'
Nevertheless, where the court finds a final agency action, the injured
plaintiff may establish standing with respect to the action by showing
injury in fact, traceability, and redressability, and thereby challenge
the entire action. Under these circumstances, it is important to
identify the underlying (final agency) action, determine standing with
respect to that action, and determine the appropriate remedy. Thus,
this Note's three-step analysis applies to suits pursued under the APA
as well.
The method of analyzing standing, and remedy proposed in this
Note is particularly appropriate where there is an overarching plan or
209. E.g. Rockford League of Women Voters v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
679 F.2d 1218, 1222 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572-73 (1975))
("[T]he scope of judicial review of agency inaction is very limited."). Consequently, citizen suit
provisions are important, because they allow private parties to compel an agency to perform a
nondiscretionary duty and courts do not have to identify a concrete final agency action where
there is only agency inaction.
The Court in NWF recognized that statutes might allow judicial review that would otherwise
be unavailable under the APA:
Some statutes permit broad regulations to serve as the "agency action," and thus to be
the object of judicial review directly, even before the concrete effects normally required
for APA review are felt. Absent such a provision, however, a regulation is not
ordinarily considered the type of agency action "ripe" for judicial review under the
APA until the scope of the controversy has been reduced to more manageable
proportions, and its factual components fleshed out, by some concrete action applying
the regulation to the claimant's situation in a fashion that harms or threatens to harm
him.
NWF, 497 U.S. at 891.
In contrast to the APA challenge in NWF, ACE III dealt with a statutory provision that
imposed an explicit, unambiguous duty on the EPA Administrator. The EPA's 10 year failure
to perform its duty (establishing TMDLs for the state of Alaska) injured the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs in ACE X sued under § 505, the citizen suit provision, of the Clean Water Act rather
than the APA. This was in all likelihood a result of the Seventh Circuit decision in Scott v. City
of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984). In Scott, the plaintiffs sued under both section
505(a)(2) of the CWA and under the APA. The court held that the complaint did not
sufficiently allege "what agency action [was] to be reviewed." Id. at 996. This was probably
because an absence of action is not considered to be an agency action that is subject to review
(as distinguished from a decision not to take action, which might reviewable). See Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (holding that while agency action provides a focus for judicial
review, agency inaction provides no such focus). But see 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1978) (defining
"agency action" to include "failure to act"); Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 (stating that the issue did
not involye a claim that the agency abdicated its statutory responsibilities). The court did find
that a state's failure to submit proposed TMDLs over a long period of time constituted a
"constructive submission" that triggered the EPA's duty to review the submission and
subsequently act. Id. at 996-97. Thus, the Seventh Circuit avoided the final agency action
analysis for the APA and characterized agency inaction as a constructive action triggering duties
under the citizen suit provision.
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action that injures many people.210 A non-CWA example is the
impact of land and resource management plans (LRMPs)211 under
the National Forest Management Act of 1976.212 These plans
provide guidance for how the Forest Service will use or set aside each
national forest.21 Thus, if an action (for example, a timber sale)
undertaken pursuant to the plan harmed someone, he or she would
have standing to challenge not only the particular sale, but also the
cause of their injury - the underlying plan.214 Not to challenge an
LRMP as a whole could lead to injury that site-specific challenges
could not avoid.215 The success of the claim would depend in part
on whether the plan dictated the outcome of the individual action, but
the plaintiff would have the opportunity to challenge the offending
plan.
In a pair of school desegregation cases, the U.S. Supreme Court
implicitly utilized a three-step analysis.216  In Keyes v. School
District,217 the Court upheld a district-wide desegregation remedy
210. As noted in Section ILA, the three-step analysis simplifies cases by tackling one issue
at a time. When an action injures many people, litigants will argue whether the plaintiff has
standing for the entire action. The three-step inquires whether the actioh is a discrete, coherent
action. If the action is discrete,,then the next issue is whether the plaintiff has standing for that
action. For standing purposes, it is irrelevant whether the plaintiff has standing for all or part
of the action.
211. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
212. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
213. See Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the LRMP, that the challenge was ripe, but the environmen-
tal impact statement of the plan was acceptable). All the subsequent actions undertaken on the
land have to be consistent with the LRMP. See Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1793 (1995).
214. See, eg., Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1397 (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge
the LRMP); Pacific Rivers Council, 39 F.3d at 1057 (holding the comprehensive LRMPs to be
ongoing plans that the plaintiffs can challenge). This assumes that the LRMP dictated the
outcome of a defective sale. The Eighth Circuit found that LRMPs are only advisory, and so
the injury was not traceable to the plan. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that finding environmental injury based solely on an LRMP would "takeol us into
the area of speculation and conjecture"). For a further discussion of standing and other issues
ielating to LRMPs, see John P. Hogan, The Legal Status of Land and Resource Management
Plans for the National Forests: Paying the Price for Statutory Ambiguity, 25 ENvrL. L. 865
(1995).
215. Resources Ltd., 8 F.3d at 1398.
216. For a discussion of school desegregation in light of these cases, see Robert A. Sedler,
Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small
Wars: The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535; Leonard P. Strickman, School
Desegregation at the Crossroads, 70 Nw. U. L. RV. 725 (1975).
217. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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where only one school in the district had de jure discrimination.21
The Court thus allowed the trial court to desegregate the entire city
of Denver.219 In contrast, the Court struck clown a multidistrict
remedy in Milliken v. Bradley.' The Court held that "without an
inter-district violation and inter-district effect, there is no constitution-
al wrong calling for an inter-district remedy."'22
The distinction between Keyes and Milliken rests upon the
"established doctrine" that requires focusing on school districts. The
Court emphasized that "[t]he constitutional right. .. is to attend a
unitary school system in that district." 2  Thus, the scope of the
duty is districtwide. Where there is a violation of this districtwide
duty, an aggrieved person has standing to seek a districtwide remedy.
However, without evidence of a more expansive violation, a court
cannot grant a remedy beyond that- particular district.2' Thus, the
three-step analysis for standing and remedy has the potential to
extend well beyond TMDL citizen suits.
C. Other Jurisdictions
The Supreme Court has yet to face a fact pattern similar to that
presented to the Ninth Circuit in ACE III. However, in its existing
decisions, the Court has decided that an individual who has been
harmed by an action need not prove standing with respect to all the
impacts of the action in order to challenge it. 4 If the action was
concrete, for instance, and defined by statute, then a person could
challenge the action, provided the constitutional standing require-
ments of injury in fact, traceability, and redressability, and any
relevant prudential standing requirements, were satisfied. It is
unimportant that the remedy sought would redress others' injuries, so
long as the remedy addressed the cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
Whether the court would grant the requested remedy is a matter
within its equitable discretion.'
218. Id. at 204.
219. Id.
220. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
221. Id. at 745.
222. Id. at 746.
223. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) ("the remedy does not exceed the
violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the condition that offends the Constitution.")
224. See, eg., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n (NWF), 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990).
225. See Veinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 320 (1982).
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In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, a divided Supreme Court
addressed standing and remedies, holding that a plaintiff must show
standing for each claim for relief. Lyons brought suit against the
City of Los Angeles and four of its police officers seeking damages,
an injunction, and declaratory relief' Lyons claimed that a police
choke hold violated his constitutional rights.' The majority held
that Lyons had to show standing separately for each claim for
reliefr9 and that Lyons did not show standing for the requested
injunction 0 The Court reasoned that Lyons did not establish a
likelihood that he would be injured again,"' nor did he satisfy the
preconditions for injunctive relief, namely irreparable injury and
inadequate remedies at law. 2  Writing for the four dissenters,
Justice Marshall noted that Lyons marked a drastic change in standing
and remedy analysis.' 3 Before Lyons, the Court's cases uniformly
226. See City of Los Angeles.v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983).
227. Id. at 97.
228. Id. at 98 (Lyons claimed that the use of the choke hold where there was no threat of
deadly force violated the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
229. See id. at 105 ("That Lyons may have been illegally choked . .. while presumably
affording Lyons standing to claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps against
the City, does nothing to establish [injury to justify an injunction] ... ."); id. at 111 (noting that
Lyons had an adequate remedy at law, thereby recognizing that he had standing for the damages
claim but not the injunction). The district court severed the damages claim from the claim for
equitable relief. Id. at 105 n.6. It is unclear what role severing the two claims played in the
Court's decision, since the Court recognized that Lyons had standing to pursue his damages
claim. Id. at 105. Under the majority's analysis, if Lyons sought damages and injunctive relief
in the same suit, he would have to prove standing for the claim for injunctive relief separately.
230. Id. at 105.
231. Id at 105-09.
232. Id. at 111. The Court presented their concerns of irreparable injury and adequate
remedy at law in the remedies context, explaining that before plaintiffs can seek injunctive relief,
they must satisfy "the requirements for entry [standing] and the prerequisites for injunctive relief
[appropriateness of the remedy]." Id. at 112. Underlying much of the Court's standing analysis
were concerns that an injunction was not an appropriate remedy since the plaintiff could not
show a sufficient likelihood that he would be choked again. Id. at 105. This analysis ignores
the requirement that to satisfy injury in fact, a plaintiff must prove that his injury is "actual or
imminent." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130,2136 (1992). Although Lyons did
not prove that his injury was imminent, that there was a sufficient likelihood that the police
would choke him again, Lyons did establish that he suffered actual injury when the police
choked him. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95,98 (1983). The Court therefore should
have recognized Lyons' standing. The Court's concerns about likelihood of future injury goes
to whether there is an adequate remedy at law and is a remedy issue. The Court confused the
requirements of standing with the requirements of an equitable remedy.
233. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 122-23 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[B]y fragmenting a single claim
into multiple claims for particular types of relief and requiring a separate showing of standing
for each form of relief, the decision today departs from this Court's traditional conception of
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looked to the underlying dispute, not the relief sought, to determine
standing.?4
Under this Note's three-step analysis, the dissenters in Lyons
should have prevailed. The underlying legal dispute was the validity
of a police policy on choke holds.35 The plaintiff suffered injury in
fact as a consequence of the police choke hold,16 and therefore he
should have standing to challenge the validity of the choke hold.
Whether the police are likely to choke Lyons in the future goes to
whether the damages are an adequate remedy, not whether Lyons
satisfied injury in fact. Thus, the Lyons majority confused the
requirements for standing with the requirements for equitable relief
In Allen v. Wright, 37 the Supreme Court backed away from a
broad reading of Lyons."a The Court characterized Lyons as a case
where the plaintiff sought an injunction against the general ',way in
which government goes about its business." 9  The Wright Court
distinguished cases where the plaintiff seeks to restructure a govern-
mental apparatus designed to fulfill the Executive Branch's legal
duties, which would violate separation of powers concerns, from cases
where the plaintiff seeks to enforce a specific legal duty whose
violation harms the plaintiff.24  In making this distinction, the
Wright Court limited Lyons to its facts.
The First Circuit followed a different approach in Conservation
Law Foundation v. Reilly (CLF)24 than the Ninth Circuit used in
ACE III. The plaintiffs in CLF sought to compel the EPA Adminis-
trator to complete its nationwide assessment and evaluation of
hazardous waste sites.242 The First Circuit held that the plaintiffs'
standing and of the remedial powers of the federal courts").
234. Id. at 128 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also i. at 130 ("Until now, questions concerning
remedy were relevant to the threshold issue of standing only in the limited sense that some relief
must be possible.").
235. Id. at 98.
236. Id. at 97-98.
237. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
238. Id. at 760-61.
239. Id. at 760.
240. Id. at 761. The desire to respect the principle of separation of powers and consequently
not hear the case may have led the Court to conveniently deny Lyons standing where a more
appropriate decision would have deemed the remedy to be unavailable. Having dropped the
claim for damages-for which Lyons had standing-all that remained was his prayer for
injunctive relief. The Court could have declared that injunctive relief was unavailable due to
the nature of the remedy sought.
241. Conservation Law Found. v. Reilly, 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991).
242. Id. at 39.
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remedy would be limited to the specific facilities for which the
plaintiffs established standing. However, the court could have
achieved that end by granting standing to sue on the violation of the
statutory duty and denying a nationwide injunction in favor of a local
injunction on equitable grounds. Although the statutory language
does not provide much support, the First Circuit could also have
explicitly interpreted CERCLA to impose separate duties rather than
a single duty on the Administrator. These would have been more
rational analyses and the First Circuit would have achieved the same
result-a limited, localized injunction. ,
The First Circuit's interpretation of Allen v. Wright and its
application to the facts of CLF highlighted the court's confusion.2 43
In Wright, the Supreme Court denied standing to plaintiffs challenging
discriminatory conduct by the IRS, reasoning that the plaintiffs had
not personally suffered a denial of equal protection or any other
injury. The Court said that simply paying taxes that go toward
discriminatory practices was not enough to show standing; the
plaintiffs2' or their children245 had to experience the stigmatizing
injury caused by racial discrimination. The Court held that granting
plaintiffs standing to seek restructuring of the Executive Branch
apparatus established to fulfill its legal duties would violate separation
of powers.2" In" CLF, the First Circuit refused to grant standing, as
doing so would allow any citizen to pursue a claim that government
officials acted illegally-essentially discarding the standing require-
ment of injury in fact.247 The Supreme Court held that "an asserted
right to have the Government act in accordance with the law is not
sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal
court."'24 The Court proceeded to find that the plaintiffs suffered
243. CLF, 950 F.2d at 43.
244. Id. at 753-56.
245. Id. at 756-58.
246. Id. at 760-61.
247. See Conservation Law Found. v. Reilly (CLE), 950 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1991).
248. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984). Wright is also distinguishable from the case
at hand because the plaintiffs had not pointed to any "specifically identifiable Government
violations of law." Id. at 759. The Court cited three cases in which plaintiffs sought, but were
refused, injunctions directed at particular system-wide law enforcement practices, because the
plaintiffs did riot allege a specific threat of being subject to the challenged practices. Id. at 760-
61 (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)). The Court concluded that separation of powers
"counsels against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations
whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by
[Vol. 6:157
ALASKA CENTER FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
no concrete injury in fact traceable to the defendant's conduct. 249
Thus, the plaintiffs in Wright did not have standing. In contrast, CLF
suffered injury due to the the EPA Administrator's failure to evaluate
hazardous waste sites on the docket as required by CERCLA °0
CLF had standing, and the scope of the remedy should have been
determined at the remedy stage.
The Seventh Circuit has followed the same basic approach as the
Ninth Circuit in granting standing to challenge actions that have an
effect beyond injuring the plaintiff However, the Seventh Circuit's
analysis did not parallel the three-step analysis in this Note. In Scott
v. City of Hammond, the court held that the State's long-standing
failure to set TMDLs for Lake Michigan constituted a constructive
submission that no TMDLs were necessary, triggering the EPA's
duties. 2 Since the plaintiff complained about only one TMDL on
one body of water, the court did not analyze the underlying legal duty
to list, prioritize, and set TM)Ls. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's
analysis in Scott at least appears consistent with the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in ACE III and this Note's three-step analysis.' '
A district court i the Eighth Circuit faced a case in which
citizens tried to compel the EPA Administrator to establish TMDLs.
In Sierra Club v. Browner,'-5 the court agreed with the analysis in
Scott and the trilogy of ACE cases, holding that citizens had standing
to sue to compel the Administrator to list WQL waters and set
TMDLs for the state of Minnesota.26 The court recognized that the
scope of the action was statewide and that the plaintiffs had standing
the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties." Wright, 468 U.S. at 761.
249. ld. at 764-66.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(d) (1986). The underlying legal duty was a nationwide duty. Thus,
CLF had standing for the nationwide action.
251. Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984).
252. Id. at 996-97.
253. It is not clear how the Seventh Circuit would have approached the problem of the
underlying legal duty. They would have had two obvious choices: (1) a statewide duty to set
TMDLs as the Ninth Circuit found in ACE III, or (2) a duty to set TMDLs on a water body by
water body basis. In Scott, the Seventh Circuit effectively found the latter, since they limited
the remedy to Lake Michigan, as requested by the plaintiff. Had they found the former, the
court would have faced the first hypothetical in Section IV.B. See supra notes 196-99 and
accompanying text.
254. The Seventh Circuit's analysis is not necessarily consistent because the scope of the
underlying legal duty, which the court never explicitly circumscribed, was different that the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of § 301(d) of the CWA.
255. Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Minn. 1993)
256. Id. at 1310-11.
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for the entire action. 7 However, the court ruled in favor of the
defendants because the EPA and the State of Minnesota were in the
process of listing waters and setting TMDLs at the time of the
decision. 8 Thus, the district couit in Sierra Club v. Browner also
utilized an analysis that is similar to this Note's three-step analysis.
No jurisdiction has explicitly used the three-step analysis
proposed by this Note. However, many rulings support various parts
of the analysis. Courts generally recognize that the relief granted can
exceed the plaintiff's particular injury in fact. 9 Thus, the threshold
step is not the extent of the plaintiff's injury. Instead, this Note's
scoping step focuses on the nature and extent of the underlying legal
duty.2" Having defined the scope of the action, courts determine
whether the plaintiff has standing to sue on that action. 26' If a court
decides the merits of the case in favor of the plaintiff, the court must
then determine an appropriate remedy. For injunctive relief, courts
generally look at the nature of the underlying claim, the same legal
duty that forms the basis for the standing analysis.262 Thus, al-
though no court has yet explicitly used this Note's three-step analysis
for standing and remedy, courts' rulings en masse affirm this
approach.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in ACE III highlights the confusion
that exists regarding the relative roles of standing and remedy in
citizen suits. This Note concludes that the proper way to approach
the problem is to first determine the scope of the underlying legal
257. See id. at 1310. The decision suggests that the court held that the plaintiffs had standing
for waters throughout Minnesota, but not necessarily every WQL body of water in the state.
If this is the case, the district court essentially used a breadth-of-injury analysis similar to that
of the Ninth Circuit, an analysis that this Note maintains confuses standing and remedies
concerns.
258. Id. at 1314.
259. E.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n. (NWF), 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990).
260. 'See also Farber, supra note 23, at 536-38; cf. Alaska Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner (ACE
111), 20 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[ACE's] injury is the result of the EPA's failure to
comply with the CWA to establish TMDILs for the State of Alaska; the CWA imposes no
narrower obligation").
261. E.g., Sierra Club v. Browner, 843 F. Supp. 1304, 1310-11 (D. Minn. 1993); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[Tlhe standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination
of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an
adjudication of the particular claims asserted" (emphasis added)).
262. ACE 111, 20 F.3d at 985-86.
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duty. To determine the specific legal obligation that the defendant
violated, a court should look to positive law. The next step is to
determine whether the plaintiff has standing to challenge that
violation (that is, whether the plaintiff suffered injury in fact, the
injury is traceable to the defendant's violation, and a favorable
judgment would redress the plaintiff's injury). Then, the court
addresses the merits of the case. If the plaintiff succeeds on the
merits, the final step is to determine the appropriate scope and form
of the remedy. If the underlying duty is statutory, the court should
determine whether the statute mandates an injunction or otherwise
precludes or limits equitable discretion. If the relief may include
injunctive relief, the court should balance the interests at stake to
determine whether and to what extent it would be equitable to grant
an injunction. An injunction may address the entire scope of the
underlying legal duty or it may address only part of the duty. Thus,
determining the underlying legal duty is important at both the
standing and remedy stages of a case. This Note provides a simple
way for courts to avoid confusing standing and remedy, thereby
reducing the possibility of inequitable decisions.
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